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ABSTRACT 
Commercial surrogacy is a valuable practice with the potential to benefit many 
people. Restricting it interferes with person's rights ofprocreationalliberty, autonomy 
and freedom of contract. Arguments that it harms children, exploits women, 
commodifies women and children and reduces altruism in the community do not stand 
up to scrutiny, and do not provide justification for the interference with those rights. 
Any risks associated with commercial surrogacy can be adequately dealt with by 
sufficient regulation. Thus the prohibition on commercial surrogacy in New Zealand 
should be lifted, and New Zealanders should be able to access commercial surrogacy 
if they so wish. 
11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my supervisors Claire Gallop and Nicola Peart for their kind 
support and thoughtful guidance. 
I am also grateful for the support of the entire Bioethics Department, who have made 
this Masters such an enjoyable and productive experience for me. 
And of course thank-you to my parents who have been such a pillar of support and 
source of love throughout my studies, and my life in general. 
111 
INDEX 
Abstract n 
Acknowledgements m 
Index IV 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Legal Status of Surrogacy in New Zealand 6 
2.1 Regulation in New Zealand 6 
2.1.1 Legislation 6 
/2.1.2 NECAHR 8 
2.1.3 Discrepancies between NECAHR and the Law 10 
2.1.4 Considerations Specific to New Zealand 11 
2.2 Regulation in Other Countries 11 
2.3 Legal Difficulties of Commercial Surrogacy 12 
2.4 Why Commercial Surrogacy should be Legal in New Zealand 15 
2.5 Conclusion 17 
Chapter 3: The Benefits of Freedom in Commercial Surrogacy: A Defence of 
Commercial Surrogacy 18 
. 3.1 Procreational Liberty 
3 .1.1 Does Procreational Liberty Impiy A Right to 
Commercial Surrogacy? 
3 .1.2 Is the Lack of Genetic Connection Relevant? 
3 .1. 3 Is the Lack of Gestational Connection Relevant? 
3 .1.4 Limits on Procreational Liberty 
3.2 Autonomy 
3.3 Freedom of Contract 
3.3.1 Problems for the Freedom of Contract Argument 
3.4 Conclusion 
18 
21 
22 
24 
25 
27 
28 
28 
31 
IV 
Chapter 4: Commercial Surrogacy- Not So Harmful After All: A Response to 
Arguments against Commercial Surrogacy 32 
4.1 Harm to Children 33 
4.1.1 Psychosocial Harm due to Separation of 
Genetic/Gestational/Social Parents 34 
4.1.2 Psychosocial Harm due to Birth being Part of a 
Commercial Transaction 35 
4.1.3 Adoption as Premeditated Impairment 36 
4.1.4 Harm from Intolerance 37 
4.1.5 Harm from Breakdown of Arrangement 38 
4.1.6 Harm to Others who are not Adopted 39 
4.2 Exploitation 40 
4.2.1 Lack of Consent 40 
4.2.2 Does More Money Mean More or Less Exploitative? 41 
4.2.3 Coercion 42 
4.2.4 Inducement 44 
4.2.5 Economic Status of Surrogates 45 
4.2.6 Transferring Burden of Risk 45 
4.2.7 Incommensurability 46 
4.2.8 Reinforcing Inequalities of Gender 46 
4.2.9 Regulation not Prohibition 47 
4.3 Commodification 48 
4.3.1 Degrading to Women and Children 49 
4.3.2 Commercial Surrogacy does not constitute Baby-Selling 49 
4.3.3 Does Commercial Surrogacy Commodify Reproduction? 52 
4.3.4 Is Reproduction Different to Other Types of Labour? 54 
4.4 Altruism 56 
4.4.1 Artificial Altruism 57 
4.4.2 Loss of Some Altruism an Acceptable Loss 57 
4.4.3 Unrecognised Altruism 57 
· 4.5 Conclusion 58 
v 
Chapter 5: Regulation not Prohibition: Legal Recommendations for 
Surrogacy 
5.1 Enforcing Contracts 
5.2 What Can Go Wrong 
5.2.1 When Everyone Wants the Child 
5.2.2 When No-one Wants the Child 
5.3 Possibilities for Contract 
5.3.1 Criminalisation- the Current Approach 
5.3.2 Unenforceability 
5.3 .3 Assimilation into Adoption Law 
5.3.4 Enforceable with Specific Performance 
5.3.5 Partially Enforceable with Damages 
5.4 How Far Can a Contract Go? 
5.5 Regulation 
5.5.1 Law Commission's Proposal 
5.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Bibliography 
60 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
64 
66 
66 
67 
69 
73 
75 
78 
79 
80 
85 
Vl 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The wish to have children is a basic human desire. 1 For this reason, infertility can have a 
devastating impact on many people.2 For those couples whose infertility is due, at least in 
part, to the woman not being able to carry a pregnancy to term (whether because she was 
born without a uterus or has had a hysterectomy, or because medical reasons such as 
diabetes, heart disease or hypertension make it impossible or highly dangerous for her to 
have a baby) surrogacy is an option. The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 
2004 defines a "surrogacy arrangement" as an arrangement under which a woman agrees 
to become pregnant for the purpose of surrendering custody of a child born as a result of 
the pregnancy. 3 
There are at least four models of surrogacy. One model is partial surrogacy where 
the surrogate's own egg is used. Partial surrogacy has been around for perhaps thousands 
of years, as is suggested by references in the bible.4 This type of surrogacy pregnancy 
may come about by using the sperm of the commissioning father to fertilise the 
surrogate's egg. Conception may occur through artificial insemination, either in a fertility 
clinic or at home, or through natural conception. 
A second model of surrogacy uses the egg of the commissioning mother (if she is 
fertile but unable to carry to term). The egg is artificially fertilised and placed into the 
surrogate. If gametes from both the commissioning parents are artificially placed in the 
1 This is recognised by article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "1. Men and women of 
full age ... have the right to marry and found a family ... 3. The family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." 
2 One study of infertile couples asked what was the primary problem in their lives. 80% said it was their 
inability to conceive. Most of the remaining 20% ranked it second after financial difficulties. The rest 
ranked it third after financial problems and marital strife. Geoffrey Sher, Virginia Marriage Davis, Jean 
Stoen, In Vitro Fertilization: The ART of Making Babies, Facts on File Inc, New York, 1998, p 2. 
3 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, section 5. 
4 "Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children: and she had an handmaid, an Egyptian, whose name was 
Hagar. And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold now, the LORD hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, 
go in unto my maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her. And Abram hearkened to the voice of 
Sarai." (Genesis 16:1-2) 
"And Jacob's anger was kindled against Rachel: and he said, Am I in God's stead, who hath withheld from 
thee the fruit of the womb? And she said, Behold my maid Bilhah, go in unto her; and she shall bear upon 
my knees, that I may also have children by her." (Genesis 30:2-3) 
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surrogate, then the baby is entirely genetically connected to them. Where the egg does not 
belong to the gestating woman the situation is described as full surrogacy. 
A third model is where donor sperm or eggs are used in combination with 
gametes from one of the commissioning parents. In this case only one commissioning 
parent will have a genetic connection to the child. The other genetic parent will be the 
donor. 
A fourth model is where both the sperm and eggs come from donors. If both 
donor sperm and eggs are used then the resulting baby has no genetic connection to the 
birth mother or commissioning parents. 
Full surrogacy arrangements mean there may be up to two biological parents (the 
donors), two gestational parents (the surrogate and her partner), and two social parents 
(the commissioning parents). Alternatively one person may fall under multiple categories, 
for example if the commissioning mother provides the egg, she will be both the 
biological and social mother of the resulting child. Full NF surrogacy first occurred in 
the United States in 1985.5 Some arguments about surrogacy apply differently to these 
different scenarios; I will elaborate as this arises. 
The term "surrogate mother" actually means substitute mother. Some people see 
this is as a misnomer as really the surrogate acts as a substitute spouse. They argue the 
gestational mother is the real mother, while the commissioning mother is actually the 
substitute.6 Nevertheless common usage of the term describes the gestational mother as 
the surrogate, and this is how I will use the term. The "commissioning parents" plan to 
take custody of the child in any surrogacy arrangement. This term tends to cover married, 
5 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 
2001, p 261. 
6 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, John A. Robertson, "Surrogate 
Motherhood: Not so novel after all", Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 45-54, p 46. 
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non-married, and same-sex couples, or an individual. My use of the term is intended to be 
read in this way.7 
Surrogacy of all kinds is generally thought of as acceptable only in situations 
where its use is necessary for medical reasons, such as where it is impossible or 
dangerous for a woman to carry a child herself. It is thus thought of as a last-resort 
measure for infertile couples.8 This is to guard against using surrogacy for convenience, 
as people worry such use could lead to different societal classes being used for 
childbegetting, childbearing and childrearing.9 I agree that surrogacy should not be used 
merely for convenience, as shifting the burden of risk - which attends any pregnancy -
from one woman to another, is intuitively unappealing and will be harder to justify. That 
said, if we accept commercial surrogacy we may be committed to it for even trivial 
reasons. However, that is not a position I wish to defend here. It is understandable for one 
woman, for whom pregnancy is impossible or highly dangerous, to ask another woman to 
act as a surrogate for her. However it is less than admirable for a woman to hire another 
to carry a child for her, merely because being pregnant would interfere with her routine or 
give her stretch marks. This kind of use of commercial surrogacy could possibly lead to a 
class-like system for reproduction, reminiscent of the dystopia in Margaret Atwood's The 
Handmaid's Tale. 10 
Surrogacy can be classified as either compassionate or commercial. 
Compassionate surrogacy is when the surrogate does not receive a fee for her 
involvement. She may receive compensation for the costs related to her pregnancy. These 
costs may include medical bills, travel costs, healthy food and keeping records of the 
7 The use of surrogacy by individuals or same sex couples may raise separate issues to those raised by 
heterosexual couples and are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
8 The NECAHR Guidelines for compassionate surrogacy state, "The intended mother must have a medical 
condition (or a medical diagnosis of unexplained infertility that has not responded to other treatments) that 
prevents her from becoming pregnant or makes pregnancy potentially damaging to her or the child." 
NECAHR homepage www.newhealth.govt.nz/necahr/guidelines/smTogacymarch2002.htm accessed 
15/02/05. 
9 Gena Corea, The Mother Machine, p 276. As cited in Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive 
Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy 
Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 277-97, p 287. 
10 Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale; McClelland & Stewart, Houghton Mifflin, 1985; Cape, 1985. 
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pregnancy, among other things. Costs sometimes include compensation for time off 
work. However New Zealand law prevents the surrogate from receiving compensation for 
carrying and delivering the child, or as compensation for time off work. 11 
Compassionate surrogacy is generally accepted as a positive and permissible 
arrangement, because the surrogate's actions are seen as selfless and generous, and it 
provides childless couples with the baby they desperately desire. It is permitted in New 
Zealand, though situations requiring the help of a fertility clinic (for artificial fertilisation 
and insemination etc) have certain (flexible) conditions attached and must be sanctioned 
on a case-by-case basis by NECAHR - the National Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Human Reproduction that deals with reproductive technology. 12 
Commercial surrogacy is where a fee is paid to the surrogate above and beyond 
the costs of the pregnancy. It is prohibited in most countries, including New Zealand, 
because the fee is seen as the purchase price for the child. There is a dispute as to whether 
such a fee is in exchange for the baby that is handed over, or for the service the surrogate 
provides to the commissioning parents. I shall argue that this fee should be viewed as 
compensation for the service provided, rather than as proof of baby-selling, and that 
therefore commercial surrogacy should be legalised. 13 
Chapter two will provide a brief history of surrogacy in New Zealand. I will 
review the current legal status of both commercial and compassionate surrogacy in New 
Zealand. I will also consider the approach that other countries have taken to commercial 
surrogacy. 
11 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 sl4. 
12 NECAHR homepage www.newhealth.govt.nz/necahr/guidelines/sunogacymarch2002.htm accessed 
15/02/05. 
13 It is difficult not to see this fee as an exchange for a baby in those commercial sunogacy contracts that 
state the fee will not be paid if the baby is born dead. After all, the sunogate has performed the service and 
the only failure is in handing over a living baby. I do not believe commercial sunogacy, or any sunogacy, 
should be unregulated, and I believe regulation should restrict clauses like this from commercial sunogacy 
contracts. 
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In the next chapter I will deal with the major arguments in favor of commercial 
surrogacy. These include: freedom of contract; procreationalliberty; and autonomy. In 
chapter three I will assert that these arguments are not only sufficient to justify permitting 
commercial surrogacy, but that allowing commercial surrogacy is necessary in order to 
uphold these values. 
Chapter four focuses on the primary arguments against commercial surrogacy. I 
will explore the notion that commercial surrogacy: harms children; exploits women; 
commodifies human beings; and reduces altruism. In chapter four I will dismiss these 
arguments as insufficient to justify prohibiting commercial surrogacy. 
In chapter five I will discuss legal recommendations for surrogacy in New 
Zealand. I will address the appropriateness and difficulties of using a contract model to 
regulate commercial surrogacy, including a discussion of the possibilities for dealing with 
the breakdown of such arrangements. Furthermore I will look at other difficulties of the 
current law, including the instability of the status of a child born through surrogacy, and 
the appropriateness of the current law's penalties and restrictions on who may participate 
in surrogacy arrangements. I will conclude that a system of regulation proposed by the 
Law Commission is the most suitable way of dealing with surrogacy in New Zealand. 
I will conclude that while regulation of surrogacy is necessary to ensure the safety 
of all parties, especially the child, prohibiting commercial surrogacy goes too far. New 
Zealand law should permit payments to surrogates for loss of income and for 
procreational services provided, and should make improved provisions for the status of 
children of surrogacy arrangements. 
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Chapter 2: Legal Status of Surrogacy in New Zealand 
Before analysing the ethical issues raised by commercial surrogacy, it is important to 
place it in its real world context. Therefore it is essential to outline the legal status of 
surrogacy in New Zealand. In this chapter I will discuss the history of surrogacy in New 
Zealand, and review the current legal status of both commercial and compassionate 
surrogacy in New Zealand. I will also provide a brief overview of the approach adopted 
in some other countries. I will review some of the legal problems that arise in commercial 
surrogacy. I will conclude that there are good reasons why commercial surrogacy should 
be legal in New Zealand. 
2.1 Regulation in New Zealand 
2.1.1 Legislation 
Until very recently, New Zealand had no law specifically regulating surrogacy. That 
changed as of November 21st 2004, when the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Act (hereafter the HART Act) was enacted. Section 14 of the HART Act provides that 
surroga,cy arrangements, though not illegal, are not enforceable. The relevant section of 
the HART Act in full reads: 
14 Status of surrogacy arrangements and prohibition of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements 
(1) A surrogacy arrangement is not of itself illegal, but is not enforceable by or 
against any person. 
(2) Subsection ( 1) does not affect the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987. 
(3) Every person commits an offence who gives or receives, or agrees to give or 
receive, valuable consideration for his or her participation, or for any other 
person's participation, in a surrogacy arrangement. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to a payment-
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(a) to the provider concerned for any reasonable and necessary expenses 
incurred for any of the following purposes: 
(i) collecting, storing, transporting, or using a human embryo or 
human gamete: 
(ii) counselling 1 or more parties in relation to the surrogacy 
agreement: 
(iii) insemination or in vitro fertilisation: 
(iv) ovulation or pregnancy tests; or 
(b) to a legal advisor for independent legal advice to the woman who is, or 
who might become, pregnant under the surrogacy arrangement. 
(5) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (3) is liable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a fine not 
exceeding $100,000, or both. 
Subsection 3 of the Act provides that any payments made in relation to a 
surrogacy arrangement, other than those set out in subsection 4, constitute an offence. 
Subsection 4 only allows payments to be made to a provider1 or a legal advisor. Payments 
to a provider may be for collecting, storing, transporting, or using a human embryo or 
gamete; for counseling the parties to the surrogacy arrangement; for insemination or in 
vitro fertilization; or for ovulation or pregnancy tests. Payments to a legal advisor may be 
for giving independent legal advice to the surrogate. This means payments for things such 
as doctors' visits for things not covered in subsection 4, maternity clothes, healthy food, 
travel expenses, and time off work, are illegal, as is paying the surrogate for the service 
she provides. 
Thus the HART Act not only makes surrogacy agreements unenforceable, it also 
makes commercial surrogacy illegal. In doing so recommendations from the Bioethics 
1 Section 5 of the HART Act defines a provider "(a) means a person who, in the course of a business 
(whether or not carried on with a view to making a profit), performs, or arranges the performance of, 
services in which donated embryos or donated cells are used; and (b) includes a successor provider." 
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Council that more public consultation was needed, and from a Ministerial Committee that 
there should be no criminal offences in relation to surrogacy, were ignored. 2 
2.1.2 NECAHR 
While specific legislation relating to surrogacy is new in New Zealand, regulation 
by other means has occurred via the National Ethics Committee on Assisted Human 
Reproduction (NECAHR). NECAHR was established by the Minister of Health under 
section 46 of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993, as a response to a perceived 
need for specialist advice on issues raised by providers of assisted human reproduction 
(AHR) services. While its primary role was to process applications for new AHR 
treatment and research, NECAHR was also to provide advice to the Minister of Health on 
AHR issues and develop guidelines for fertility providers on ethical issues relating to 
AHR. 
In July 1997 NECAHR gave ethics approval in principle for compassionate 
surrogacy using NF, subject to guidelines to be developed. NECAHR has since been re-
established under section 11 of the Public Health and Disability Services Act 2000, 
retaining the same functions.3 Until recently, NECAHR's most current guidelines relating 
to surrogacy were their Guidelines for Non-commercial Altruistic Surrogacy using NF 
as Treatment, developed over almost ten years and revised in March 2002.4 However in 
April 2005 new Guidelines on IVF Surrogacy were released. The Guidelines are self-
imposed by providers of AHR in NZ. However, for accreditation reasons, clinics are 
bound to act with ethical approval. Acting against the guidance of NECAHR could 
2 In their Submission to the Health Select Committee on the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology 
("HART") Bill SOP No. 80, the Bioethics Council recommended that commercial surrogacy arrangements 
not be prohibited before there had been sufficient time to elicit the views of the public on the topic. 
http://www.bioethics.org.nz/publications/hart-submission-jul03/ accessed 23/02/05. A 1994 Ministerial 
Committee recommended that apart from certain changes regarding providers and potential providers of 
assisted reproduction and surrogacy services, "no criminal offences in relation to surrogacy should be 
created." Bill Atkin & Paparanga Reid, "Assisted human Reproduction: Navigating Our Future" Report of 
the Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, July 1994, Crown Copyright, 
Wellington, Summary of Options pp 1, 4. 
3 NECAHR homepage www.newhealth.govt.nz/necahr!history.htm accessed 15/02/05. 
4 NECAHR homepage www.newhealth.govt.nz/necahr/guidelines/surrogacymarch2002.htm accessed 
15/02/05. 
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therefore result in professional disciplinary actions and loss of accreditation. 5 The 
Guidelines thus have more power than might usually be assumed of self-imposed 
guidelines. Since the Guidelines were issued in 1997 NECAHR has received 36 
surrogacy applications, 27 of which have been approved, two provisionally approved, 
three declined and three withdrawn or discontinued. NECAHR is aware of four births, 
one including twins, resulting from those arrangements.6 
The key requirements taken into account when NECAHR considers an application 
for compassionate surrogacy using IVF are as follows. At least one of the intended 
parents should be the potential child's genetic parent. There must be a medical condition 
that precludes pregnancy. The birth mother must be a family member or close friend. 
Pregnancy and childbirth expenses may be paid but there cannot be payment in lieu of 
employment. The birth mother and her partner should have completed their own family. 
Both parties must have independent legal advice regarding legal issues. Both parties must 
have independent counseling dealing with the emotional and legal risks. 
NECAHR points out that the language of the Guidelines reflects graduated levels 
of expectation. Therefore language such as 'should have' indicates areas where 
negotiation is possible, whereas 'must have' shows terms that are mandatory.7 Under the 
previous Guidelines, the only requirements to have this mandatory language were those 
for independent legal advice and counseling. The new Guidelines are significantly more 
restrictive, as now several more requirements are all mandatory. Those are: that there 
must be a medical condition precluding pregnancy; the birth mother must be a family 
member or close friend; and there cannot be payments made in lieu of employment. 
The requirements that there must be a medical condition precluding pregnancy, 
and that all parties receive independent legal advice and counseling, are understandable, 
5 Bill Atkin & Paparanga Reid, "Assisted Human Reproduction: Navigating Our Future" Report of the 
Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, July 1994, Crown Copyright, Wellington, p 
103. 
6 Law Commission, New Issues in Legal Parenthood, Preliminary Report 88, Wellington, April2004, 
www.lawcom.govt.nz, para. 7.17. 
7 Idem 4: 
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and indeed, I will argue, necessary. The preference that the birth mother will have 
completed her own family is to decrease the likelihood that the surrogate will want to 
keep the child, and is in consideration of the risks that could potentially prevent the 
surrogate having more children following the surrogate pregnancy. These reasons are 
sensible, and being only a preference, this requirement is appropriately negotiable on a 
case-by-case basis. The preference that one of the intended parents also be a genetic 
parent is understandable considering there has not been a wide amount of discussion 
regarding the use of surrogacy by couples where both parties are infertile. However as 
this situation is likely to be far less common than that where at least one intending parent 
can produce fertile gametes, I assume NECAHR would consider fairly those couples who 
were unfortunate enough to both be infertile. As for the tightening of those rules 
requiring the surrogate to be a friend or family member, and restricting payments beyond 
mere costs of pregnancy, I believe New Zealand policy is moving in the wrong direction. 
2.1. 3 Discrepancies between NECAHR and the law 
NECAHR's guidelines permit recompense to be made to the surrogate for 
expenses related to pregnancy and childbirth, but state that the intended parents "cannot 
make payment to the birth mother in lieu of employment." However, even allowing 
payment to the surrogate for expenses related to pregnancy and childbirth would appear 
to contravene the HART Act's requirements that no valuable consideration be made for 
participation in a surrogacy arrangement other than under subsection (4). 
I believe NECAHR's current approach to surrogacy is overly restrictive; however 
it appears that even NECAHR is advocating practices outside the law as set down by the 
HART Act. NECAHR's approach is more realistic than that of the HART Act, in that it 
recognizes that forcing the surrogate to bear the costs of pregnancy and childbirth is an 
undue burden. I will argue that it is important to go even further, since there is no 
inescapable problem with surrogates making a profit from their involvement in a 
surrogacy arrangement; however this idea is highly contested. But at the very least a 
surrogate should not be unduly burdened by the costs of a pregnancy that is for the 
10 
benefit of persons other than herself. That would amount to a punishment for her act of 
altruism. 
2.1.4 Considerations Specific to New Zealand 
In New Zealand, policy must take account of Tikanga Maori. Ken Daniels writes 
that Maori, in terms of customary practice, have no objections to the concept of surrogacy 
in that it is very similar to the customary practice of whangai where a child is given into 
the care of a relative (sometimes because the matua whangai (adopting parents) do not 
have a child of their own).8 However views on whangai may not necessarily extend to 
commercial surrogacy because of perceived fundamental differences between the two 
practices. Whangai placements are usually arranged between members of the same hapii 
or iwi, rather than between strangers; also they are not necessarily seen as permanent, it 
being not uncommon for the child to later return to the birth parents. 9 It is thus unclear 
whether there are any objections to commercial surrogacy arising from Tikanga Maori. It 
is clear however, that there is objection to the notion of anonymous donation of gametes, 
due to the concept of whakapapa. 10 As it is important to know one's genealogy, 
knowledge of genetic heritage should be available even when one's genetic material has 
been donated. 
2.2 Regulation in Other Countries 
In the United Kingdom the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 prohibits commercial 
surrogacy, but in practice surrogacy is increasingly practiced on a commercial basis. 11 In 
8 Ed. 's Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas, Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspectives, Ken Daniels, "The Policy and Practice of Surrogacy in New Zealand", Hart Publishing, 
Oregon, 2003, pp 55-66, pp 64-5. 
9 Law Commission, Report 65, "Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New 
Framework" Wellington, September 2000, pp 180-2, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publicationsR65ado.PDF, accessed 26/03/05. 
10 Supra 8. Daniels notes that NECAHR "also seeks to take account of the fact that there are many Maori 
who have distanced themselves from traditional values and practices and that there are a variety of 
viewpoints among Maori in relation to AHR." 
11 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 
2001, pp 264-5. 
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the United States the law varies greatly between states, but in general it appears 
legislation tends to discourage commercial surrogacy. 12 However, despite this, the US is 
the primary place where commercial surrogacy arrangements occur. 13 Most Australian 
States outlaw commercial surrogacy, and Queensland prohibits even non-commercial 
14 ' 
surrogacy. Other countries that completely prohibit the use of surrogacy include 
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Norway. 15 
2.3 Legal Difficulties of Commercial Surrogacy 
Separating out reproduction into biological, gestational, and social roles has created 
problems for the law in defining the legal parents of a child born of a surrogacy 
arrangement. Different jurisdictions have dealt with this problem in different ways. UK 
law unequivocally defines the woman who gives birth to the baby as its mother. 16 As the 
legal mother, the gestational mother has an absolute right to decide whether to keep the 
child or hand it over to the commissioning couple. 17 The common law presumption of 
paternity within marriage, and the provisions of the Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Act 1990, grant paternity to the husband of the surrogate mother, unless he did not 
consent to the insemination. 18 19 
Law varies in the United States. In California, motherhood is allocated to the 
genetic and gestational mother in partial surrogacy arrangements. However in the more 
12 Lori Andrews, "Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood" Virginia 
Law Review vol. 81 (1995) pp 2343-2375, p 2349. As quoted by Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: 
Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 262, footnotelO. 
13 Ed. 's Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas, Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspectives, Eric Blyth and Claire Potter, "Paying for it? Surrogacy, Market Forces and Assisted 
Conception", Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, pp 227-242, p 231. 
14 Supra 11, pp 262, footnote 9. 
15 Ibid, pp 283, footnote 90. 
16 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s27(1) "The woman who is carrying or has carried a 
child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be 
treated as the mother of the child." 
17 Supra 11, p 266. 
18 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s28(2) " ... the other party to the marriage shall be treated 
as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the placing in her of the embryo or the 
srerm and eggs or to her insemination (as the case may be). 
1 Jackson notes that paternity is here granted to the man least expecting to be the child's father. Supra 11, p 
272. 
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complex full surrogacy arrangements, where genetic and gestational motherhood are 
separated, a distinction has been made. In some states priority for legal motherhood has 
been given to the woman who provided the genetic material and/or the woman who 
intended to become the mother, rather than the gestational mother.20 This is more aligned 
with the way legal paternity is determined, which comes down to whom the genetic 
father is?1 A US court has suggested it might be discriminatory to use this genetic 
standard for determining the legal father but not mother.22 
New Zealand law, via section 5(1) of the Status of Children Amendment Act 
1987, regards the birth mother and her male partner (if he consented to the procedure) as 
the legal parents of a child conceived using donor semen and/or ovum. That covers the 
situation of surrogacy using NF, and artificial insemination performed at home. If the 
surrogate's partner does not consent to the procedure, or she has no partner, the 
commissioning father (if he is also the donor) is the legal father, but he has no legal rights 
or responsibilities?3 This will change on July 1st 2005 when the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 2004 comes into force. From that time the donor of any sperm used to 
artificially conceive will not be deemed a parent of the resultant child, nor have any rights 
or responsibilities of a parent, unless the woman has no partner at the time of conception 
and the donor later becomes the woman's partner.24 While in the past, parties to some 
surrogacy arrangements have listed the surrogate mother and intended father as the 
parents on a child's birth certificate, the Law Commission has noted that the Status of 
Children Amendment Act 2004 will make it unlawful to do that?5 
20 In Johnson v Calvert (1993) 851 P 2d 776 (Cal) the Californian Supreme Court indicated that either a 
genetic or gestational relationship was sufficient for a declaration of maternity under Californian law. As 
both components were split in this case, intention was the determinative factor and the intending mother, 
who was the genetic mother, was deemed the legal parent. 
21 Supra 11, p 268. 
22 "In Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz App Div 1 1994) the Appellate Court found 
that an Arizona surrogacy statute which provided that the gestational surrogate is the legal mother of the 
child to be born violated the biological mother's equal protection rights." Quoted by Emily Jackson, 
Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 268, footnote 
25. 
23 Section 5(2) Status of Children Amendment Act 1987. 
24 Section 22 Status of Children Amendment Act 2004. 
25 "The changes introduced by the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004 combined with section 89(l)(a) 
of the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act 1995 will make it unlawful to register the father in 
those situations." Supra 6, para. 7.23 footnote 276. 
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The situation is different where natural intercourse has been used to conceive. If 
the surrogate has a husband, he will be presumed the legal father by virtue of section 5 of 
the Status of Children Act 1969. Evidence of intercourse with the commissioning father 
can be used to rebut this presumption in order to have a declaration of paternity granted 
to the commissioning father. Such evidence may need to consist of blood and DNA 
tests.26 However while a declaration of paternity will make the commissioning father the 
legal father, it will not give him guardianship and therefore custody rights; for this he 
would have to apply to the Family Court.27 Opinion is divided over whether the Status of 
Children Act presumption of fatherhood currently applies to a de facto partner of a 
surrogate; and it will not apply when the new Act comes into force. 28 It must be noted 
however, that there does not appear to be many instances of natural intercourse being 
used in surrogacy; it appears that more often insemination is achieved artificially at home 
with the use of equipment such as a turkey baster. Therefore, in nearly all cases, the 
commissioning parents cannot become the legal parents except by acquiring the parental 
rights and responsibilities via adoption. 
Transferring parental rights and responsibilities to the commissioning couple is 
done through adoption. Once the adopting parents have been screened and deemed 
acceptable by Child Youth and Family Services, the process will be relatively straight 
forward so long as the legal parents do not object.29 Custody is transferred in an interim 
26 Supra 5, p 104. 
27 Guardianship Act 1968 s6A Declaration as to guardianship of father. 
28 Section 2 of the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987 states that a reference to a married woman 
includes a relationship in the nature of marriage. This would appear to cover section 5 of the Status of 
Children Act 1969 which assumes that a child born to a woman during her marriage shall be the child of its 
mother and her husband, thus including a de facto partner, but this has been debated (see para 4.2 Law 
Commission Report 88). However the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004 will repeal the Status of 
Children Amendment Act 1987 without replacing section 2 with a similar interpretation section. Therefore 
a de facto partner will not be assumed the father of a child born through natural conception, but will be 
assumed the father of a child conceived by artificial means, unless he explicitly makes it known he does not 
consent to the procedure (s27 2004 Act). Changes to the Status of Children Act 1969 by the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2005, which come into force 1 July 2005, only affect Part 2: Status of children 
conceived as a result of AHR procedures, and therefore do not remedy this anomaly. The Law Commission 
has recommended that the presumption of fatherhood be extended to de facto partners, Law Commission, 
New Issues in Legal Parenthood, Report 88, Wellington, April2005, Recommendation 3 p 32. 
29 Adoption Act 1955 ss 6 and 7. 
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order made by the court,30 and six months later the intending parents may apply to the 
court for a final adoption order. 31 However, if a dispute arose in a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement in New Zealand, it would be difficult to enforce the pre-arranged contract. 
Even if commercial surrogacy were not illegal under the HART Act, the courts would 
likely hold commercial surrogacy contracts void as trumped by public policy. This is 
because placement of a child is decided according to what is best for that child's welfare, 
so this decision cannot be made by private bargaining between the parties.32 A contract to 
pay the surrogate might also be illegal in contravention of the Adoption Act 1955.33 
If commercial surrogacy were to be made legal in New Zealand, further thought 
would need to be given to the current law that deals with the transfer of paternity. 
Suggestions for such changes and for the regulation of commercial surrogacy will be 
discussed in chapter five. 
2.4 Why Commercial Surrogacy should be Legal in New Zealand 
The recent passing of the HART Act has made commercial surrogacy illegal in New 
Zealand.34 I argue that this law is problematic and unsound, and that New Zealand should 
permit commercial surrogacy provided there is sufficient regulation to safeguard against 
potential harms to women, children and society. 
New Zealand's position on commercial surrogacy is inappropriate for several 
reasons. Firstly the restriction by the HART Act against any compensation being made to 
a surrogate places an unfair burden on a surrogate. Also the policy ofNECAHR allowing 
reimbursement of general costs, but not of loss of income, appears arbitrary. NECAHR 
30 Adoption Act 1955 s 5 and s 15(2)(a). 
31 Adoption Act 1955 s 13. 
32 Supra 5, pp 105-6. 
33 Adoption Act 1955 s25(1) "Except with the consent of the Court, it shall not be lawful for any person to 
give or receive or agree to give or receive any payment or reward in consideration of the adoption or 
proposed adoption of a child or in consideration of the making of arrangements for an adoption or proposed 
adoption." 
34 Section 14 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, which came into force 22nd November 
2004. 
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objects to compensation for time off work, arguing it amounts to payment for being a 
surrogate. 35 This dissertation argues that such payment for being a surrogate is 
appropriate. But at any rate, time taken off work in order to be a surrogate should be 
considered a general cost; it is compensation rather than profit. Not compensating for loss 
of income may be prohibitively expensive for women who would like to act as 
surrogates. 
Secondly this policy is not in line with NZ policy in other areas. Commercial 
surrogacy is sometimes compared to or associated with prostitution. Though the NZ 
Government does not condone it morally, it has decriminalized prostitution?
6 While I 
argue that it is inappropriate to compare commercial surrogacy to prostitution, the 
Government is no more justified in prohibiting commercial surrogacy than prostitution. 
Prohibiting either is too great an interference with the liberty of its citizens, and far from 
preventing harm, can actually have detrimental effects on vulnerable people in society. 
Driving a practice underground is rarely a good way to protect people. Another policy 
area that can be seen as similar in certain regards to commercial surrogacy is payments to 
living kidney donors. The same arguments against paying surrogates have traditionally 
been made against paying living organ donors. However the Government has recently 
announced its intention to change its policy on compensating living kidney donors. It 
proposes compensating donors for time off work with payments of between $100 and 
$300 a week.37 Surrogates should be treated similarly as it is equally valid for surrogates 
to be at least compensated for time off work. 
Thirdly, as I shall argue further below, there are no valid reasons for restricting 
payments to surrogates. This includes payment that constitutes compensation for time off 
work, and payment for the service they provide to a commissioning couple. Any element 
of inducement that results from such payments is not necessarily problematic. 
35 Supra 9, p 206. 
36 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s7. 
37 "Government Pays Organ Donors" http://www.xtramsn.co.nz/health/0,7998-4058689,00.htm1, accessed 
21102/05. 
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And lastly, restrictions against payments to a surrogate other than for costs (which 
exclude compensation for loss of income) are easily circumvented and difficult to police. 
Payments to surrogates for permitted costs may easily be fleshed out to get around the 
prohibition against paying a fee or compensating for loss of income. Or payments may be 
made secretly and discretely. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The recent legislation of commercial surrogacy, and the tighter regulation of 
compassionate surrogacy demonstrate a tightening of policy regarding surrogacy in New 
Zealand. Despite this, there seem to be some discrepancies in regulation, between the 
legislation set down in the HART Act and the Guidelines established by NECAHR. 
There are legal problems created by the practice of surrogacy, and commercial surrogacy 
in particular, that would need addressing if commercial surrogacy were legalized. Some 
law, particularly adoption law, would need adjusting in order to minimize these 
problems. The current restriction against compensating a surrogate for loss of income is 
arbitrary considering compensation for other costs is allowed, and places an unfair 
burden on surrogates. The restriction against commercial surrogacy in general is not in 
line with New Zealand policy in other comparable areas. Additionally there are no valid 
reasons for preventing a surrogate from being paid for the service she provides, and it 
will be very difficult to ensure these types of payments are not being made. 
In the next chapter I will argue that commercial surrogacy should be permitted, so 
as to protect persons' rights of procreationalliberty, autonomy, and freedom of contract. 
Then in chapter 4 I will dismiss the major arguments against commercial surrogacy, thus 
expanding on why it is not problematic to pay surrogates for the service they provide. In 
chapter 5 I will discuss other possibilities for the regulation of commercial surrogacy. 
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Chapter 3: The Benefits of Freedom in Commercial Surrogacy: A Defence of 
Commercial Surrogacy 
The HART Act currently prohibits commercial surrogacy by making it an offence to give 
or receive consideration for participation in a surrogacy arrangement (other than for 
specific, narrow purposes). 1 The objections to commercial surrogacy are outlined in the 
next chapter. As explained there, those arguments can be overcome or accommodated. 
But there are also strong reasons in favour of legalising commercial surrogacy. The major 
arguments in favour of commercial surrogacy rely on procreationalliberty, autonomy and 
freedom of contract. While some of the arguments only defend the rights of certain 
parties to a commercial surrogacy contract, all three arguments together provide an 
adequate defence of its permissibility. 
3.1 Procreational Liberty 
Procreational liberty is a right to decide whether or not to reproduce. This right is 
important because reproduction is a meaningful and important experience, central to the 
identity and dignity of human beings, and a right that is generally intuitively accepted.
2 
Carson Strong argues that procreative freedom is valuable not only because freedom in 
general is valuable, but also because reproduction is important to many people's ideas of 
self-identity and self-fulfilment.3 Indeed, the right to found a family is a right under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.4 
1 HART Act, s 14(3): "Every person commits an offence who gives or receives, or agrees to give or 
receive, valuable consideration for his or her participation, or for any other person's participation, or for 
arranging any other person's participation, in a surrogacy arrangement." Section 14(4): "Subsection (3) 
does not apply to a payment- (a) to the provider concerned for any reasonable and necessary expenses 
incurred for any of the following purposes: (i) collecting, storing, transporting, or using a human embryo or 
human gamete: (ii) counselling 1 or more parties in relation to the surrogacy agreement: (iii) insemination 
or in vitro fertilisation: (iv) ovulation or pregnancy tests; or (b) to a legal advisor for independent legal 
advice to the woman who is, or who might become, pregnant under the surrogacy arrangement." 
2 John Robertson, "Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics" American Journal of Law & Medicine, vol. 
29 no. 4 2003, pp 439-488, pp 450-1. See Robertson for a discussion of the potential deeper explanation 
that reproduction is biologically important to us, pp 451-2. 
3 Carson Strong, Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine: A New Framework, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1997, pp 12&24. 
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, article 16, paragraph 1: "Men and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family" 
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Strong defines procreation as involving begetting, gestating and rearing, and 
recognises that procreators need not participate in all three components.
5 Whether the 
right to procreate is a positive right is debatable; a positive right would impose 
obligations on others to provide the means to procreate. That the right is a negative one is 
a much stronger argument. Strong says this implies the right is only a prima facie right. 
This means the right is not absolute, but can only be overridden for very important 
reasons. 6 
The Brazier Report agreed that "procreative autonomy [is not] an absolute right, 
especially since it can come into conflict with the rights of others."
7 On the other hand, 
cases in which sterilisation has been sought for mentally incompetent women for the 
purposes of contraception, have upheld that the right to procreate is not easily overridden. 
In KR v MR and X v Y, it was held that sterilisation had such profound implications, that 
without consent of the person, it could only be permitted when it was in the best interests 
of the person and was the least restrictive option. It could never be done merely for the 
convenience of others. 8 Viewing the right of procreation as a negative one does not 
necessarily impose a duty on others to uphold and provide opportunities for that right to 
be utilised. Rather it implies that others cannot interfere with the taking advantage of this 
right. Thus in the same way that sterilising a person against their will interferes with their 
right to decide whether or not to reproduce, so does prohibiting them from utilising 
commercial surrogacy if it is the only means possible for them to reproduce. 
John Robertson discusses whether procreative liberty exists and starts by 
examining rights not to procreate.9 In most countries the right to avoid procreation by the 
use of contraceptives or abortion has received explicit legal recognition.
10 Robertson says 
5 Supra 3, p 13. 
6 Ibid, pp 25-6. 
7 Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell and Susan Go lombok, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of 
Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation- Report of the Review Team (Oct 1998) paragraphs 
4.32-4.33. 
8 MR v KR [2004] 2 NZLR 84 7; 2004 NZLR LEXIS 7, X v Y (2004) 23 FRNZ 4 7 5. 
9 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, John A. Robertson, "Noncoital and 
Procreative Liberty" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 249-58, p 249. 
10 In New Zealand the relevant act is the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. 
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the absence of similarly explicit law concerning the right to procreate (which is regarded 
as equally or more important), "shows how widespread and deep is the social 
understanding of the right to reproduce through sexual intercourse."
11 This right to 
reproduce coitally comes from the fact that "creating and rearing biological descendants 
is immensely meaningful for individuals and society."12 Because there is such meaning 
involved, reproduction is not generally an area that a state can become involved in, or put 
restrictions on (without very good reason that is). 13 Due to technology, reproduction is 
now an option for many people for whom it was not an option before. This raises the 
question of whether reproductive liberty also applies to noncoital reproduction. Strict 
definitions of reproduction usually make reference to conceiving and bearing offspring as 
a result of sexual activity. However John Robertson believes procreative liberty should 
also apply to noncoital reproduction because it may be the only way for the person to 
reproduce. 
The couple's interest in reproducing is the same, no matter how 
conception occurs, for the values and interests underlying coital 
reproduction are equally present. Both coital and noncoital conception 
enables the couple to unite egg and sperm and thus acquire a child of their 
genes and gestation for rearing. Aside from religious views that see coitus 
and reproduction as inextricably linked, the particular technique used to 
bring egg and sperm together is less important than the resulting 
offspring. 14 
He thus concludes that noncoital techniques such as AID (artificial insemination by 
donor) should also be protected along with the rights to coital protection. Again, as what 
is being argued for is a negative right to procreational liberty, this protection does not 
amount to a right to have services, such as AID, provided free of charge. A choice by a 
State to subsidise particular services is admirable, but not necessary. Their only 
11 Supra 9, pp 249-50. 
12 Ibid, p 250. 
13 Extreme overpopulation in China may or may not be an example of a good reason for the state to 
interfere in reproductive liberty. 
14 Supra 9, pp 250&52. 
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responsibility is to not interfere with people's accessing of these services. If a State does 
not subsidise particular services this may mean that elements of procreational liberty, 
such as commercial surrogacy, are not affordable to everyone. This does not equate to an 
argument against commercial surrogacy, as in general more liberty comes with having 
more money. This is a fact of our society rather than a problem specific to commercial 
surrogacy. 
3.1.1 Does Procreational Liberty Imply A Right to Commercial Surrogacy? 
However, in looking at the rights of others, such as donors or surrogates, to 
participate as third parties in reproduction, "participating in partial reproductive 
roles ... may have less of the meaning that gives reproduction its significance, and 
therefore not be as fully protected."15 Yet the need for a third party to provide assistance 
in order to help a couple achieve reproduction could fall within the couple's reproductive 
rights, as they cannot fulfil their right without this third party help. Robertson thus 
suggests state interference with a couple's right to contract with a third party in this 
situation would need compelling justification. This includes interference with the 
couple's right to pay a surrogate, as such prohibition might prevent a couple from finding 
a willing surrogate, thus preventing them from obtaining the assistance they need. 16 
Melissa Lane has a slightly different approach. For her, procreationalliberty, or as 
she describes it, reproductive freedom, protects the right of women or men to contract 
with surrogates, this contractual right being a corollary of the fundamental interest in 
reproductive freedom. The fundamental interest means a right to use whatever technology 
is available, which leads to a right to contract a surrogate. However, she believes it also 
protects the right of women to act as birth mothers through surrogacy. 17 
15 Ibid, p 250. 
16 Ibid, pp 249-58, p 253. 
17 Ed. 's Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas, Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspective, Melissa Lane, "Ethical Issues in Surrogacy Arrangements" Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, pp 
121-39, p 130. 
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While Lane sees a woman's right to reproduce as a surrogate as independently 
protected by procreational liberty, Robertson only sees it as a part of the commissioning 
parents' right to reproduce. 18 Robertson's view seems to provide a stronger argument 
against opponents of surrogacy such as Bonnie Steinbock. Steinbock believes the right to 
reproduce only means "a right to have one's own children." She says the fundamental 
right to reproduce does not exist where there is no intent or ability to rear, such as in 
surrogacy. 19 In surrogacy arrangements (at least where some gametes from the 
commissioning couple are used), procreational liberty would therefore protect the 
couple's right to use surrogacy. Robertson's argument also appears to be the stronger one 
because the underlying values of procreational liberty - that it is valuable to create and 
rear offspring- seem to exist more obviously in the commissioning couple's case (who 
would choose to both create and rear the child if at all possible), than in the surrogate's 
case (who intends to gestate the child but has no intention of rearing it). 
3.1.2 Is the Lack of Genetic Connection Relevant? 
I tum now to the distinction between surrogacy arrangements where the intending 
parents are genetically related to the child, and where they are not because both are 
infertile and require donated sperm and eggs. Like Steinbock, Robertson limits his 
definition of procreationalliberty by describing it as a freedom to take steps that result in 
the birth of biologic offspring.20 This definition means procreative liberty protects the 
right to create a child through partial or full surrogacy where gametes from at least one of 
the commissioning parents are used. It does not protect using surrogacy where both the 
eggs and the sperm are donated, as the commissioning parents have no genetic 
connection to the child. This seems an arbitrary distinction when all variables otherwise 
remain the same. This differentiation seems to rely on an outdated idea of parenthood that 
places primary importance on genetics. Emphasis on genetics harks back to ideas of a 
parent's ownership of a child; an idea, as I will discuss in chapter four, we are trying to 
18 It could still be argued a woman has the right to act as a commercial surrogate under the arguments of 
autonomy and freedom of contract, if not procreative liberty. 
19 Bonnie Steinbock, "A Philosopher Looks at Assisted Reproduction" Journal of Assisted Reproduction 
and Genetics, p 12: 543-551. 
20 Supra 2, p 447. 
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move on from. If procreative liberty protects the right of a couple to use AID to conceive, 
therefore using donor gametes, the right does not belong only to the parent who will have 
a genetic connection to the child, but to both intending parents. Also the fact that the law 
gives legal parentage to a birth mother,21 whether or not the child is genetically hers, is 
evidence of a societal emphasis moving away from genetics and towards social 
relationships. 
Robertson argues that a right to rear children not genetically related is not covered 
by procreative liberty because this occurs "only after reproduction has occurred and [is 
not] determinative of whether reproduction will occur."22 I argue this is not so in the case 
of surrogacy where both gametes are donated, as without initiation of the process and an 
intention to rear by the commissioning parents, the non-genetically related child that 
results would never have been born. Robertson himself queries the importance of a 
genetic connection when looking at what constitutes reproduction. He questions whether 
a woman can be said to be reproducing when she is merely gestating, and has no genetic 
connection to the child. He thinks strictly speaking she is not, but the egg donor is. In the 
case of a donor who intends no contact with a child, however, Robertson believes the 
other interests that make reproduction so highly valued are missing, so as not to merit the 
practice of donating gametes with the same protection that we otherwise wish to accord 
reproduction.23 Robertson adds, however, and I agree, that in the case of gestating and 
rearing without a hereditary link, those other valued interests might exist anyway, and 
thus still be justifiably protected by procreative liberty.24 This protection should be 
extended to cases where intending parents will have no genetic link to their child, but as 
the ones who have brought together all genetic and gestational elements and intend to 
rear the child, are responsible for bringing the child into being. In such cases their actions 
are obviously evidence of them having those interests we deem worthy of protection. The 
State has recognised this in supporting the provision of AID and IVF services. 
21 ' 
The Status of Children Amendment Act 1987, s 5(1). 
22 Supra 2, p 448. 
23 A right to donate gametes would thus fall under a couple's right to procreate through receiving gametes. 
24 Supra 9, p 258. 
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3.1.3 Is the Lack of Gestational Connection Relevant? 
A difference between traditional uses of AID and IVF, and surrogacy is that with 
surrogacy the couple will have no gestational connection to the child. Opponents of 
surrogacy may see this as relevant. In arguing for the priority of gestational connection 
over genetic connection, Sara Ann Ketchum notes that to stress a genetic connection as 
the essential criterion for parenthood, implies adoptive parents are not real parents?5 I 
would add that to stress a gestational connection over all others would also marginalise a 
father's role, as a father is never capable of gestation. Rosemarie Tong believes that the 
gestation of a child is evidence of the gestating mother's commitment to the child, in that 
she was committed enough to bring it to term. For this reason she sees the gestational 
mother as having more right to the child than any genetic or intentional parent. These 
types of argument will prima facie always give a mother more rights than a father.
26 Any 
argument that appears to show women as having special connections or rights in relation 
to their children, runs the risk of allocating them special responsibilities. If we are to 
diminish the rights of a father because he lacks the gestational relationship to the child, 
we may find this also diminishes any responsibilities the father has to that child. This is a 
dangerous direction for society to move in, as it would likely erode rather than promote 
gender equality. It is also ironic that a gestating mother, who has intentions of handing 
over the child at birth, is automatically assumed to be more committed to the child than 
the parents who have gone to such great lengths and intend to raise the child for at least 
the next 18 years. The commissioning parents show more than "mere intention", they 
show a powerful desire for and commitment to the child they have collaborated in 
creating. Therefore they equally deserve the protection of the right of procreative liberty. 
25 Sara Ann Ketchum, "New Reproductive Technologies and the Definition of Parenthood: A Feminist 
Perspective," presented at Feminism and Legal Theory: Women and Intimacy (a conference sponsored by 
the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987). As cited in Ed. Kenneth D. 
Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death of a Feminist 
Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 
277-97, p 291. 
26 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death 
of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1992, pp 277-97, p 281. 
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Procreational liberty protects people's rights to reproduce usmg those 
technologies that are necessary. This includes a right to use surrogacy, and to contract 
with others in order to do so. As restrictions against paying surrogates may interfere with 
finding a willing surrogate, such restrictions would constitute an unacceptable 
interference with people's procreative liberty. This argument holds because any harm 
caused by commercial surrogacy (as will be discussed in chapter four) is not significant 
enough to justify interfering with procreationalliberty. 
3.1.4 Limits on Procreational Liberty 
One limit on procreative liberty arises when the involvement of a third party, such 
as a doctor, becomes necessary in order to bring about conception. It is said above that 
for the state, or anyone else, to be able to interfere with a person's rights of reproduction, 
a very compelling justification would be necessary. Doctors and clinics occasionally 
refuse to provide noncoital reproductive facilities to some persons citing just such a 
compelling justification. This reason is the law, which provides that the interests or 
welfare of the (future/potential) child must be taken into consideration when deciding 
whether to provide such services.27 Therefore consideration must be given to the 
suitability of the potential parents. What the law says does not in itself justify effectively 
setting a test, which infertile persons must pass to become parents, but fertile persons 
need not. A better reason is needed to discriminate against some infertile couples, and 
justify the law behind the discrimination. Donald Evans suggests that this reason is third 
party responsibility. When AID is used, the assistance of third party medical personnel is 
required. 
Doctors are accountable for foreseeable consequences of their actions 
and .. .it would be as irresponsible to ignore the interests of the not-yet-
27 The HART Act 2004 s 4(a) provides: "the health and welfare of children born as a result of the 
performance of an assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an important 
consideration in all decisions about that procedure." Note that the words "an important consideration" 
replaced the intended word "paramount" on the recommendation of the Select Committee that reviewed the 
HART Bill, http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Content/SelectCommitteeReports/195bar2.pdf, accessed 
10/03/05. 
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conceived child as of the prospective mother. A doctor would be entitled 
to refuse to offer such treatment to a woman if, in his judgement, the 
treatment constituted an overwhelming threat to the health or survival of 
the woman. Similarly it would be improper to expect him to proceed 
with an intervention which would stand an overwhelming chance of 
producing unacceptable suffering or danger to the child whose 
conception and birth was the intent of the action. 28 
Though it may be hard to identify what the needs of the child are, it is 
nevertheless something that must be given consideration. It can be seen as similar to the 
process of adoption, where the persons placing a child have some responsibility to said 
child to place them in a safe environment. Care must be taken however to make 
judgements only based on the safety and welfare of the child. Those persons making the 
decisions must take care not to let their own prejudices get in the way.
29 If a clinician is 
inclined to deny AID to a couple seeking to use surrogacy, he/she must do so only if 
he/she can discover some real and serious risk to the potential child from this situation, so 
that going ahead with AID would amount to ignoring the health and welfare of any child 
that might result.30 It should be kept in mind that without the surrogacy arrangement the 
child may never even exist; therefore the decision is not between a good life and a bad 
life for the potential child, but rather between a life and no life at all. 31 
28 Donald Evans, "The Interests of the Child in Medically Assisted Surrogacy", International Family Law, 
Dec 2000, pp 167-72, p 169. 
29 Ibid, p 170. 
30 The HART Act 2004 s 4(a) provides: "the health and welfare of children born as a result of the 
performance of an assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an important 
consideration in all decisions about that procedure." Note that the words "an important consideration" 
replaced the intended word "paramount" on the recommendation of the Select Committee that reviewed the 
HART Bill, http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Content/SelectCommitteeReports/195bar2.pdf, accessed 
10/03/05. 
31 This is a huge issue, and is outside the scope of this dissertation. For more on this area see Tim Mulgan 
& Andre_w Moore, "Surrogacy, Non-existence and Harm", New Zealand Family Law Journal, volume 2, 
number 7, pp. 165-171. 
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3.2 Autonomy 
The defence of commercial surrogacy in terms of promotion of autonomy relates to a 
woman's right to act as a surrogate for money, which as noted above, may not be 
separately covered by procreational liberty. It is irrelevant what reasons a woman has for 
wanting to be a surrogate. Whether it is for the financial reward or because she finds the 
joy her actions bring to the commissioning parents to be immensely meaningful. Whether 
it is due to the fact it allows her to experience gestation (which some women enjoy) 
without the responsibility of rearing, or for a combination of these reasons. Allowing a 
woman to decide for herself whether to act as a commercial surrogate recognises that she 
has bodily autonomy; prima facie control over what happens to her body. Autonomy is 
generally regarded as "the pre-eminent value in contemporary medical ethics."
32 Yet its 
position as such is not uncontested. The present importance accorded to autonomy in 
medical ethics is currently being challenged from several directions.
33 Gerald Dworkin, a 
theorist of autonomy, admits that autonomy is not the only or the supreme value. He 
acknowledges a person's autonomy is equal in importance to their welfare, liberty or 
rationality.34 In that case, autonomy must only be valued to the extent that in making use 
of it one does not injure or limit the freedom of others.
35 As I will discuss in the next 
chapter, commercial surrogacy does not cause significant harm to the participants of 
commercial surrogacy, or any other persons, and nor does it limit their freedom (in fact it 
increases the freedom of infertile couples). As such, preventing women from making 
their own choices about acting as commercial surrogates is an unjustifiable limit on their 
autonomy, and amounts to inappropriate interference with their bodily integrity. 
32 James Stacey Taylor, 'Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales', Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, Vol. 19, No.3, 2002, 273-85, p 274. 
33 Ibid, p 284. Taylor acknowledges challenges to the pre-eminence of autonomy in medical ethics from 
feminists and communitarians among others in footnote 8. 
34 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge, CUP, 1988, ch. 2, p 32. 
35 Joel Feinberg, 'Personal Sovereignty and its Boundaries', Harm to Self, Oxford, OUP, 1986, pp. 52-97, 
p. 65. 
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3.3 Freedom of Contract 
The freedom of contract defence relies on the general liberal presumption that people 
should be free to contract with others, as long as that practice does not cause any 
significant harms. The doctrine of freedom of contract states that people have the right to 
bind themselves legally. The concept includes the idea that contracts should not be 
hampered by external (for example governmental) control, as they are based on mutual 
agreement and free choice.36 This restriction against interference is limited only by public 
policy, which will constrain contracts that deal with illegal matters or would cause 
significant harm. What this means for commercial surrogacy is that people should be able 
to make contracts with women for them to act as surrogates in exchange for money, and 
women should be free to contract to act as surrogates for money, in the absence of these 
contracts causing significant harm. The harms commonly asserted to be caused by 
commercial surrogacy will be dismissed in the following chapter. Additionally the 
Government has not prohibited compassionate surrogacy, which implies surrogacy in 
general is not against public policy. It could thus be assumed that the difference between 
compassionate and commercial surrogacy - that is the payments made to the surrogate -
are against public policy. However as these payments are for services rather than a baby, 
it is difficult to see how they could be. Therefore commercial surrogacy contracts should 
be permitted. 
3.3.1 Problems for the Freedom of Contract Argument 
Melissa Lane acknowledges several problems that must be overcome in order for 
the freedom of contract argument alone to justify commercial surrogacy. One argument is 
that commercial surrogacy contracts as they currently exist (in those countries where they 
do exist) do not usually conform to the central requirements of contract law. This 
argument elaborates that a woman's consent to act as a surrogate is not freely given, as 
no-one is able to consent in advance to giving up a child they have gestated; this is 
because they will not know until after the birth whether they want to keep the child or 
36 Ed Bryan A. Gamer, Black's Law Dictionary, gth edition, Thomson West, US, 2004, p 689. 
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not.37 Without valid consent, the contract is not legitimate. However the idea that a 
person cannot consent to something that they do not know in advance how they will feel 
about would preclude anyone consenting to anything for the first time. In addition, Lane 
points out that refusing to hold women responsible for their actions or able to act freely, 
as we do when we say they are not capable of consenting in this situation, infantilizes, 
and thus disrespects them.38 Jackson questions why it is presumed a woman can give 
valid consent to an abortion or adoption, yet not surrogacy, 39
 and Andrews warns us away 
from the presumption that hormonal changes in pregnancy affect rational choice. 
40 
The next issue Lane notes must be overcome in order to use freedom of contract 
to defend commercial surrogacy, is the argument that even real consent cannot serve to 
legitimise commercial surrogacy. This argument sees commercial surrogacy as something 
that is not legitimised by consent, in the same way that we do not allow people to consent 
to being sold into slavery. Lane suggests this argument is based on the belief that 
commercial surrogacy is exploitative, commercialising, and degrading. The dismissal of 
these arguments in the following chapter finds this challenge lacking. 
The other challenge that Lane finds against using freedom of contract as a 
justification for commercial surrogacy, is that surrogacy is a structure more appropriately 
dealt with by family law than contract law. Because surrogacy involves the welfare of a 
third party - the child - family law insists that the best interests of the child must be the 
primary consideration on the occasion of assigning custody.
41 Strict contract law, on the 
other hand, is unable to consider the child's best interests if custody has previously been 
decided by a contract. This overriding element of family law means the contract cannot 
be enforced to decide who should get custody of the child. Because of this, the contract 
37 SupraJ7, p 129. 
38 Idem. 
39 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 
2001, p 301. 
40 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Lori B. Andrews, "The Challenge for 
Feminists" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 205-19, p 211. 
41 Care of Children Act 2004, s 4: Child's welfare and best interests to be paramount. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Children, Article 3: "The best interests of the child to prevail in all legal and 
administrative decisions;" ratified by New Zealand 12th December 2001. 
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can at best be used to demonstrate the intentions of the parties. Lane argues that the fact 
that contracts cannot strictly conform to traditional contract law (as policy prevents them 
being enforced) means it is hard to see freedom of contract alone as a sufficient 
justification for commercial surrogacy. 
However the fact that a contract will not necessarily be enforced does not imply 
that it is worthless. In the New Zealand case P v K, an agreement was made between a 
lesbian couple and a homosexual couple over custody of a child. The child was the result 
of artificial insemination of one of the women with the sperm of one of the men. As a 
donor, the male had no statutory right as a father because of the Status of Children 
Amendment Act. 42 However the Court was of the opinion it did not follow that the 
agreement should be ignored, provided that it was in the best interests of the child. 
43 In 
Re Evelyn, Australia's first litigated surrogacy case, Jordon J found that although an 
agreement for surrogacy was void and unenforceable, this did not require him to 
disregard the terms of the agreement altogether. He decided it was appropriate to take 
into account the intentions and expectations of the parties. While such considerations 
were secondary to the child's best interests, he saw "the circumstances surrounding her 
creation [as] pertinent to such an assessment."44 These cases thus show that a contract 
might still have some worth, despite not being strictly enforceable. 
It therefore cannot be said that a commercial surrogacy contract does not conform 
to traditional contract law, as freedom of contract is always subject to public policy. The 
cases above show that while public policy requires a child's best interests to be the 
primary determinant of custody, a contract that is in the child's best interests will be 
considered. Therefore freedom of contract is a viable argument for allowing commercial 
surrogacy. 
42 Status of Children Amendment Act, sll(l)(b): "The man who produced the semen transferred into the 
fallopian tubes shall, for all purposes, not be the father of any child of the pregnancy whether born or 
unborn.~' & s5(2)(b): ''The man who produced the semen used in the procedure shall not have the rights 
and liabilities of a father of any child of the pregnancy, whether born or unborn, unless at any time that man 
becomes the husband of the woman." 
43 P v K [artificial insemination by donor] (2002) 22 FRNZ 677. 
44 Re Evelyn No. B.R. 7321 of 1997 (unreported). 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The right of procreational liberty is a strong argument for allowing couples to contract 
with surrogates for money, in order to fulfill their reproductive needs. This right however, 
does not independently protect women's rights to act as surrogates for money, as that 
right only falls under the couples' rights. Rather, the defense of autonomy provides 
sufficient argument for allowing women to act as commercial surrogates. The ideal of 
freedom of contract supports allowing commercial surrogacy contracts. Even though such 
contracts will not always be enforceable, this is in line with the idea that public policy 
may interfere with freedom of contract when significant need arises. Thus when these 
three arguments are taken together, we find sufficient justification for removing the 
current prohibition on commercial surrogacy. In fact a prohibition on commercial 
surrogacy amounts to an unjustifiable interference with some persons' rights in relation to 
one or more of these values. In order to uphold these values, it is necessary for New 
Zealand law to allow commercial surrogacy to exist. 
In the next chapter I will discuss the arguments that are most commonly used 
against allowing commercial surrogacy. It is claimed that commercial surrogacy causes 
harm to children, the exploitation of women, the commodification of women and 
children, and the loss of autonomy in society. It is argued that these reasons are sufficient 
justification for interfering with the rights of procreationalliberty, autonomy and freedom 
of contract. I disagree that these risks are significant, and certainly do not see that they 
amount to good reason for interfering with the rights discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Commercial Surrogacy Not So Harmful After All: A Response to 
Arguments against Commercial Surrogacy 
In addition to the arguments for commercial surrogacy that rely on procreationalliberty, 
autonomy and freedom of contract, there are other arguments against commercial 
surrogacy. I will deal with four of the major arguments in this chapter. The first is that 
commercial surrogacy can harm children in several ways. I argue that most of these 
alleged harms are avoidable or insignificant, and that where commercial surrogacy does 
present a risk of harm to children, the risk is no more significant than other risks to 
children that we accept. The second argument is that commercial surrogacy exploits 
women. While many of the arguments for exploitation are unconvincing, I argue that 
evidence of exploitation is not grounds for prohibition anyway. I acknowledge this is an 
unusual stance, as usually exploitation is something to avoid. Opponents of commercial 
surrogacy have a valid argument if they show it to be irrevocably exploitative and 
harmful. However the truth is that relationships can be exploitative while still benefiting 
both parties, and thus harm will not always follow exploitation. The third argument is that 
commercial surrogacy commodifies children and women's labour. I disagree that it 
commodifies children, and question why the commodification of women's labour is 
problematic. The fourth argument is that commercial surrogacy reduces altruism in 
society. While this claim would be significant if it were true, I argue that regulation does 
not stop altruism diminishing, that this argument has not prevented change in some other 
areas, and that commercial surrogacy can in fact be altruistic. 
An argument that is more difficult to articulate seems to be primarily an 
emotional objection to commercial surrogacy. This argument condemns all surrogacy, but 
particularly commercial surrogacy, as morally wrong for reasons besides those of harm, 
exploitation, commodification, and loss of altruism. The argument, often put forward by 
religious groups, appears to be that commercial surrogacy severs the relationship between 
mother and baby; and it involves a third party intruding on and splitting the unity of 
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marriage. 1 These concerns are widespread and must be respected. We can respond to 
these arguments in a rational manner: a new relationship is created to replace the severed 
one; AID is collaborative reproduction, not adultery; surrogacy appears to be accepted 
even in the bible.2 However a reasoned response is unlikely to be sufficiently convincing 
to those who hold deep-seated emotional concerns about surrogacy. Respect for and 
consideration of these concerns is necessary; banning commercial surrogacy in response 
to them is not. For the State to interfere with individual liberty by banning commercial 
surrogacy, more justification is required than emotional responses that have not been 
reflected on. As John Harris says, "In so far as the decisions to reproduce in particular 
ways or even use particular technologies constitute decisions concerning central issues of 
value ... the state would have to show that more was at stake than the fact that a majority 
found the ideas disturbing or even disgusting."3 That said, State policy that completely 
ignored public intuition would be equally problematic. However, society ought not to 
morally condemn people who require other people's assistance in having children, when 
it has not similarly condemned parents for soliciting or accepting help in otherwise 
raising their children, for example through social arrangements such as adoption, step-
parenting, foster-parenting, wet-nursing and baby-sitting.4 
4.1 Harm to Children 
A common argument against commercial surrogacy is that it is harmful to children in 
various ways. These supposed harms include: psychosocial harm from being separated 
from a birth parent, and discovery one's birth was the result of a commercial transaction; 
harm from the reactions and intolerance of outsiders; harm from the breakdown of an 
1 Ed. 's Dani Singer & Myra Hunter, Assisted Human Reproduction: Psychological and Ethical Dilemmas, 
Whurr Publishers Ltd, London & Philadelphia, 2003, Jim Richards, "Ethical Issues- the Major Faiths: a 
Personal View" pp 41-57, p 52. 
2 "Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children: and she had an handmaid, an Egyptian, whose name was 
Hagar. And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold now, the LORD hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, 
go in unto my maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her. And Abram hearkened to the voice of 
Sarai." (Genesis 16: 1-2) 
3 Ed. 's John Harris & Soren Holm, The Future of Human Reproduction: Choice and Regulation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998, John Harris, "Rights and Reproductive Choice pp 5-37, p 36. 
4 Ed. Warren T. Reich, MacMillan Compendium: Bioethics: Sex, Genetics, and Human Reproduction, 
Simon & Schuster MacMillan, New York, 1995, Rosemarie Tong, Surrogacy chapter, p 9952. 
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arrangement; and harm to other children who might have been adopted but for the birth 
of the surrogate child. These supposed harms are due to several different elements of 
commercial surrogacy arrangements and some are claimed to even affect children not 
involved in commercial surrogacy arrangements. Harm to children would certainly 
appear to be a sufficient reason to prohibit a practice, however the question is whether the 
harms we are talking about are significant and inevitable. I argue that the alleged harms 
are speculative, uncommon, avoidable or not substantial enough to justify prohibition of 
commercial surrogacy. In addition, most of these arguments apply equally to 
compassionate surrogacy. As we have legalised compassionate surrogacy in New 
Zealand, subject to regulation, these arguments have obviously not been found to be 
persuasive. Commercial surrogacy should be acknowledged to be as safe and valuable as 
compassionate surrogacy. 
4.1.1 Psychosocial Harm due to Separation of Genetic/Gestational/Social Parents 
Risk of psychosocial harm to surrogate children is one suggested harm, suggested 
by Herbert T. Krimmel among others.5 With surrogacy, as with adoption and artificial 
insemination by donor (AID), genetic, gestational and social parentage is separated. For 
the child that discovers this background there may be a desire to establish a relationship 
with the absent "parent". Inability to do so may affect self-esteem and create feelings of 
rejection and rootlessness.6 Krimmel is talking specifically about surrogacy where the 
birth mother is also the genetic mother, and the commissioning father is also the genetic 
father, however this argument can apply equally to the other types of surrogacy. However 
John A. Robertson points out, and I agree, that these risks are tolerated in the situations of 
AID and adoption, and the fact that the adoption is planned pre-conception in surrogacy 
does not increase these risks.7 In fact Emily Jackson suggests that as research regarding 
5 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Herbert T. Krimmel, "Surrogate Mother 
Arrangements from the Perspective of the Child" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 57-70, p 
57. 
6 Moves worldwide to encourage openness and honesty with children in such relationships suggest these 
risks are-capable of being lessened. Additionally donors are more often being encouraged to be accessible 
to their donor offspring if the offspring wish to get in touch. 
7 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, John A. Robertson, "Surrogate 
Motherhood: Not So Novel After All", Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p 45, p 47. 
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adopted children appears to show that the younger children are at time of adoption, the 
less chance there is of social difficulties arising, there might be comparatively little 
impact on children of surrogacy arrangements who are generally handed over at birth.8 
Additionally provisions such as openness with the child can counter these potential 
problems. In their third review of surrogacy in 1995, the British Medical Association 
concluded that "although little evidence is available, the risk of serious psychological 
harm to the child is considered low if open acknowledgement is made from an early stage 
in the child's life."9 At any rate, this argument is one that applies equally to commercial 
and compassionate surrogacy, and despite this, compassionate surrogacy has been found 
acceptable in New Zealand law. 
4.1.2 Psychosocial Harm due to Birth being Part of a Commercial Transaction 
There is further speculation that psychological harm to a child may arise from 
discovering that his or her birth was the result of a commercial transaction. 10 However, 
"unlike many children conceived naturally, these children may have the psychological 
advantage of knowing that their birth was planned and wanted" as "people who engage in 
surrogacy arrangements only do so because they have a strong desire to have a child." 11 
In fact in the comparable realm of AID, it has been suggested that some children 
appreciate the lengths to which their parents went to conceive them. 12 Similar arguments 
have not been raised over IVF, despite the fact that couples pay a third party sometimes 
great sums of money effectively in order to obtain a child. While opponents may argue 
that this is reason to ban all such practices, such a response shows little understanding of 
the devastation many infertile couples feel at not being able to have children, and ignores 
the significance human beings attach to reproduction. 
8 Emily jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 
2001, p 296. 
9 British Medical Association, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood: A Report on Surrogacy, London, 
1995. As cited in Law Commission, New Issues in Legal Parenthood: A Discussion Paper, Preliminary 
Paper 54, Wellington, 2004, p 48. 
10 Supra 8, p 296. 
11 Ibid, p 297. 
12 R. Snowden, G.D. Mitchell, & E.M. Snowden, Artificial Reproduction: A Social Investigation, London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1983, p 121. 
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4.1.3 Adoption as Premeditated Impairment 
While we may accept the risks associated with adoption and AID, Krimmel 
questions parents' rights to "premeditatedly create a child with planned and intended 
impairments."13 The suggestion that adopted children are automatically impaired due to 
the circumstances of their birth must offend many adopted children and their parents, and 
Krimmel offers no evidence of such impairment. Jackson points out that any argument 
against surrogacy based on risk of psychosocial harm to children is largely speculative 
(Krimmel admits he is speculating14) due to there being little information about the long-
term impact of surrogacy arrangements on children. 15 At any rate potential harm to 
children must be put into perspective. If we are going to prioritize potential harm to 
potential future children over the very real distress of involuntary childlessness to 
infertile couples, we need to show that the harm to such children is more than merely 
speculative, and morally more important than the harm to those couples. 16 While 
opponents might argue that this appears to be treating the child as a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself, a similar accusation could be made against all parents who 
planned their pregnancy. 17 
Additionally, it cannot be seriously argued that the potential harm outweighs non-
existence, bearing in mind that, "but for the surrogate contract, this child would not have 
been born at all."18 With few exceptions wrongful birth claims (claims that one would 
have been better off never having been born) have been rejected. 19 The two major reasons 
13 Supra 5, p 64. 
14 Ibid, pp 65-6, footnote 1. 
15 Supra 8, p 295. 
16 Ibid, p 296. 
17 Jackson notes an unqualified application of the Kantian imperative would forbid the donation of sperm, 
eggs, embryos, non-vital organs, human tissue, and blood, among other things; all actions we currently 
accept. Jackson, idem, p 298. She also cites John Harris' claim that the Kantian imperative "is so vague and 
so open to selective interpretation and its scope for application is consequently so limited, that its utility as 
one ofthe 'fundamental principles' ofmodern bioethical thought ... is virtually nil." John Harris, "Clones, 
Genes and Human Rights" in Justine Burley ed. The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, pp 61-94, p 68. 
18 Supra 7, p 47. 
19 Edwards v. Blomeley [2002] N.S.W.S.C. 460 gives a recent overview of the relevant case law. 
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given by courts have been: that to legally recognize birth as an injury undermines the 
sanctity of life; and that damages would be impossible to determine as it would require 
comparing life and non-existence.20 Additionally, there is risk of harm to every child 
born. In general this is a risk we are prepared to tolerate, and it would be discriminatory 
to focus only on the risks to children of surrogacy arrangements, without examining the 
circumstances of every child's birth. This is another argument that applies equally to 
commercial and compassionate surrogacy, and has therefore not been found to be 
convincing in New Zealand law. 
4.1.4 Harm from Intolerance 
Some argue there is harm to children from the reactions of outsiders. William 
Pierce thinks this is a sufficient reason to prohibit surrogacy, as surrogacy children "are 
being made fun of. Their lives are going to be ruined.'m Though he aims his comments at 
surrogacy in general, I can imagine critics might think this argument applies even more 
strongly to commercial surrogacy.22 However, Lori Andrews rightly responds, "It would 
seem odd to let societal intolerance guide what relationships are permissible."23 We 
should be encouraging societal tolerance rather than putting restrictions on people's 
liberty for fear of intolerance. At any rate, lifting the legal prohibition on commercial 
surrogacy is likely to soften some people's reactions to it.24 Additionally, as one judge 
responded to the argument that children are harmed by stigma, "It is just as reasonable to 
expect that they will emerge better equipped to search out their own standards of right 
and wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral 
20 Anne Morris & Severine Saintier, "To Be or Not to Be: Is That The Question? Wrongful Life and 
Misconceptions" Medical Law Review, 11 Summer 2003, pp 167-93, p 168. 
21 In The Matter of a Hearing on Surrogate Parenting before theN. Y. Standing Committee on Child Care 
(May 8, 1987) [statement of William Pierce at 86]. 
22 I can imagine critics suggesting more intolerance may be directed at the child born of a commercial 
transaction, than of a supposedly more altruistic compassionate arrangement. Therefore I will not assume 
this argument has been overcome by the acceptance of compassionate surrogacy in NZ. 
23 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Lori B. Andrews, "Surrogate 
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists", Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p 205, p 215. 
24 Other examples of this happening are the legalisation of homosexuality, and the decriminalisation of 
prostitution. 
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judgments ... "25 We thus cannot assume that the risk of intolerance from others that 
comes with commercial surrogacy, outweighs the benefits to the surrogate child and 
his/her family. 
4.1. 5 Harm from Breakdown of Arrangement 
Another harm it is feared commercial surrogacy would risk posing to children is 
the harm arising from the breakdown of the arrangement. It must be admitted that 
custody disputes and legal battles are not in the best interests of children. However it is 
believed that only about 1% of commercial surrogacy arrangements break down.Z6 This is 
not a concern limited to commercial surrogacy, or surrogacy generally, as all families are 
at risk of breaking down and resulting in custody disputes. The risk also exists in relation 
to adoption. The birth parents may change their minds after the adoptive parents have 
been informed they can adopt a particular child. That risk has not been sufficient to 
outlaw adoption. Additionally, regulation and adequate preparation prior to arrangements 
being made (in terms of counseling, screening, legal advise, and parties being made 
aware of all possible circumstances that may arise) can significantly reduce such risks. It 
is also interesting that failure rates for surrogacy arrangements in the US, where 
commercial surrogacy is the norm, are much lower than in the UK, where only unpaid 
surrogacy arrangements are legal.27 It is plausible to argue that disputes may be more 
25 Judge in a lesbian custody case, M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super, 425, 438, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1979). As cited in Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Lori B. 
Andrews, "Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists", Oxford University Press, New York, 
1992, p 205, p 215. 
26 Elizabeth Anderson, "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, Winter 1990, 
19: 1, Academic Research Library, pp 71-92, p 88. Also, Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of 
Reproductive Technology, Lori B. Andrews, "The Challenge for Feminists" Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1992, pp 205-19, p 209. Andrews notes that 75% ofbiological mothers who give a child up for 
adoption later change their minds, whereas only around 1% of surrogates have similar changes of heart. See 
also Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Case Studies, "The Case of Baby M: 
Parenting Through Contract When Everyone Wants the Child" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 
pp 317-34, p 330. And Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart 
Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 264, footnote 12. 
27 Supra 8, p 284. 
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common when surrogates are unpaid, and therefore allowing commercial surrogacy may 
lead to even lower numbers of arrangement breakdowns.28 
4.1.6 Harm to Others who are not Adopted 
An additional harm that commercial surrogacy arrangements are accused of 
relates to children other than those that result from the arrangement. Martha Field has 
suggested that commercial surrogacy creates babies at the expense of other children who 
already exist and need a home; children who are available for adoption.
29 It is even 
suggested that devoting energy or resources to producing more babies is immoral given 
unwanted and disadvantaged children already exist. This argument would also apply to 
all other infertility treatments, yet Field does not seem to aim similar attacks against 
them. Couples who desire a child genetically related to one or both of them are also 
accused of being narcissistic or egotistical.30
 However, the increasing availability of 
abortion and contraception has dramatically lowered infertile couples' chances of 
adopting. Jackson also sensibly points out that infertile individuals bear no more 
responsibility for the world's neglected children than anyone else, and questions why the 
preference of fertile individuals to have their own biologically related children is not 
similarly condemned. 31 Again this is an argument that could be equally aimed at 
compassionate surrogacy, yet has not apparently been deemed strong enough to prohibit 
that in New Zealand. 
Thus the risk of harm to children born of surrogacy agreements is not 
significantly higher than the risk to any child born. Most of these arguments have already 
been dismissed in New Zealand, as evidenced by the acceptance of compassionate 
surrogacy. As they have not been accepted as reasons to make compassionate surrogacy 
28 Michael Freeman, "Does Surrogacy Have a Future after Brazier?" Medical Law Review, vol. 7 no.1, 
1999, pp 1-20, p 7. Freeman suggests a surrogate who has been paid may feel more of an obligation to hand 
over the baby, than one who has not. 
29 Martha Field, "Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues" Creighton Law Review vol. 25 
no. 5 pp 1589-98, p 1592, as cited in Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and 
Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 294. 
30 Supra 8, p 294. 
31 Ibid, p 295. 
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illegal, nor can they amount to a case against legalising commercial surrogacy. The 
remaining arguments aimed solely at commercial surrogacy are equally unconvincing. 
4.2 Exploitation 
It is commonly argued that commercial surrogacy should be prohibited because it is 
exploitative to women, particularly poor women. This exploitation is attributed to: a lack 
of consent in commercial surrogacy agreements; coercion; inducement; the transference 
of the burden of risk of a pregnancy; the incommensurability of reproduction; 
commodification; and reinforcing inequalities of gender. However commercial surrogacy 
is not necessarily exploitative. Additionally, as an arrangement can be exploitative and 
yet still be mutually beneficial for both parties, the presence of exploitation does not 
automatically justify prohibition. 
4.2.1 Lack of Consent 
Marxist feminists are one group who argue commercial surrogacy is exploitative 
because poor women can not give real consent to being commercial surrogates. The 
choice to become a commercial surrogate is not a real 'choice' they argue, when one is 
choosing between poverty and exploitation, because one is just choosing the lesser of two 
evils. 32 But if desperate need undermines consent then many contracts, including some 
for employment, do not have valid consent. People often enter into contracts to sell 
property or services when they desperately need money. Such need does not make one 
incapable of weighing up the positives and negatives of various options. Admittedly 
people who are poor may be more vulnerable than others, and so regulation should be 
used to prevent such vulnerable people being taken advantage of. But regulation is as far 
as we should go as we should not assume that poor people necessarily have less 
autonomy than others. We do not want autonomy and consent to become the realms of 
32 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death 
of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1992, pp 277-97, p 284. 
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the wealthy. Individuals must still be allowed to make their own choices about what is the 
best option for them. 
4.2.2 Does More Money Mean More or Less Exploitative? 
Some Liberal feminists, such as Lori B. Andrews, argue that commercial 
surrogacy is only exploitative if surrogates are paid too little. Andrews questions, as do I, 
why surrogacy is regarded as exploitative when a surrogate is paid, but not when she is 
not paid.33 34 Prohibiting payment risks reinforcing stereotypical notions that women are 
inherently altruistic,35 which pressures women into thinking they must be altruistic (even 
at their own expense) and encourages others to take advantage of these supposedly 
natural altruistic tendencies. Expecting women to labour for others for free is unjustified 
exploitation. 
However while the Liberal feminist solution to exploitation is higher 
compensation, the Marxist feminist argument is that high sums of money coerce women, 
particularly poor women, into becoming surrogates, thus making their consent defective. 
Usually adding more choices to a person's options is freedom enhancing, but this is not 
always the case. Paul Hughes suggests that adding certain choices to a person's set of 
33 Lori B. Andrews as cited in Tong, ibid. 
34 This argument against commercial surrogacy focuses on the pressure exerted by financial inducements, 
but ignores that equally strong pressure of a social or emotional kind may exist in compassionate 
arrangements. Emily Jackson has pointed out that it may be very difficult to refuse a request to be a 
surrogate from a close friend or relative. She quotes Kim Cotton, a surrogate mother and founder of COTS 
(Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy) as saying that her experience has shown "surrogacy within 
families tan be more problematic than with strangers ... family members can feel pressured and obliged to 
help." Even the Brazier Report on surrogacy acknowledged that the pressure on a family member or friend 
to help may be extreme, yet still considered this kind of altruistic arrangement to be preferable to those 
involving payment. Kim Cotton, "Surrogacy Should Pay" British Medical Journal, vol. 320, pp 928-9, p 
928. Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell & Susan Golombok (1998) Surrogacy: Review for Health 
Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payment and Regulation (London HMSO) Cm 4069. As cited in 
Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2001, 
p 304. As these groups attacking commercial surrogacy on exploitation grounds are not usually aiming 
similar attacks at compassionate surrogacy, it would appear that their problem with commercial surrogacy 
stems more from the involvement of money than issues of exploitation. The matter then falls under the area 
of commodification, which is dealt with below. 
35 Ed. 's Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas, Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspectives, Eric Blyth and Claire Potter, "Paying for it? Surrogacy, Market Forces and Assisted 
Conception", Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, pp 227-242, p 233. 
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options may in fact compromise their autonomy rather than be freedom-enhancing. The 
example he gives is, "the legal option of refraining from pressing charges against one's 
assailant", which fear of retaliation may press victims into using. He describes this as a 
constraining option, and lists the ability to sell one's organs for money as another 
example. The explanation is that the utilization of this added option may leave the person 
in a worse-off position, which undermines their autonomy.36 
However Hughes' argument is less convincing when you get down to the details. 
Imagine a mother cannot feed her children and the state will not give her adequate help, 
so she chooses to donate a kidney for money, or become a paid surrogate. Though it may 
appear that she had little choice, if we prohibit her from even making that decision then 
we may leave her with no choice at all. Who is society to make that judgment as to what 
is best for that mother and her family if it is unwilling to offer any other help? We must 
consider the morality of banning life-saving options while failing to provide societal 
relief. For if society refuses to adequately help those in poverty, then it should at least 
stop blocking them from helping themselves.37 While the situation in New Zealand may 
not be quite this extreme (our society does provide aid to a mother trying to feed her 
children) there may be many reasons why a woman might choose to become a surrogate, 
such as paying off debts, or paying for her children's educational costs. As Richard 
Arneson says, people should be left to make their own decisions on what is an acceptable 
compromise. 38 
4.2.3 Coercion 
Additionally, surrogacy cannot be seen as coercive if we look at one dominant 
philosophical view of coercion. This view is that threats coerce whereas offers do not. 
Threats limit freedom while offers enhance it. A threatens B by proposing to make B 
36 James Stacey Taylor, 'Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales', Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, Vol. 19, No.3, 2002, 273-85, pp 277-8. 
37 A.S. Daar, 'Paid organ donation--the Grey Basket concept', Journal of Medical Ethics, London, Dec 
1998, Vol. 24, Iss. 6, pg. 365-9, p 366. 
38 Richard J. Arneson, "Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Spring 1992,21:2, Academic Research Library, pp 111-64, p 158. 
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worse off relative to some baseline. A makes an offer to B by proposing to make B better 
off relative to some baseline. Refusing a threat will leave B worse off, refusing an offer 
will leave him no worse off. Therefore a threat reduces a person's baseline while an offer 
increases it.39 On this account, the surrogate is not coerced by the option of surrogacy 
because she is not threatened to be worse off if she does not do something. Surrogacy 
might be preferable to all her other options, but so are all offers we decide to accept. And 
while she may prefer not to be a surrogate but for the compensation, so might many 
people prefer not to work but for the compensation.40 Burrow's, Finn and Todd on 
contract law explain that coercion is a necessary element to show that an illegitimate 
threat constitutes duress. Thus, also in law is coercion linked to threats not offers.
41 
Gerald Dworkin suggests that one way offers can make us worse off is 
psychologically. The more choices we are given, the higher risk there is for fretting over 
the decision-making process and regretting the decisions we make.
42 Refusing an offer 
may therefore make B worse off if he worries that he made the wrong choice. It is what 
S. A. Kierkegaard calls the "despair of possibility."43 However while an offer can in this 
way make someone worse off, the harm is not such that it provides an argument against 
increasing people's choices, and nor does it show that offers can be coercive. 
A surrogacy proposal thus looks like an offer, and therefore cannot coerce. But it 
is also suggested that some potential surrogates are still coerced by their background 
conditions, which are so bad as to make accepting a surrogacy proposal their only real 
option. In this situation the background conditions, rather than the offer, are the 
problem.44 While the surrogate may have a right against society to improve her 
background conditions, that right is not against the intended parents. Therefore if we 
39 Alan Wertheimer, Coercion, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987, ch 12, p 202, pp 202-11. 
40 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1996, Ch 4, p 109. 
41 Burrows, Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in NZ, Wellington, Butterworths, 1997, p 344. 
42 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, 
pp 72-3. 
43 S. A. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and the Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1954), 169. as cited in Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p 73. 
44 Supra 40, p 111. 
43 
want her to be able to improve her conditions, she must be allowed to accept the offer. 
"From B's perspective, the only thing worse than an exploitative agreement would be no 
agreement at all." It seems unlikely that a potential surrogate is coerced by an offer that 
she would like to receive.45 Any general prohibition to protect against possible coercion 
in some cases is a choice to protect one group from exploitation by preventing others 
from making non-coercive and mutually beneficial transactions.46 
4.2.4 Inducement 
Another argument against commercial surrogacy is that the surrogacy fee induces 
women into becoming surrogates. However it is not obvious that inducement is a bad 
thing. A common view of inducement is one where people who are desperately short of 
money agree to do things that are not in their best interests, thus suggesting they have not 
given informed consent. But acting as a surrogate is not necessarily against a woman's 
best interests. If acting as a compassionate surrogate is safe enough to be accepted in 
New Zealand, then doing the same thing for money is no more risky. In fact the money 
may make it more in a woman's best interests. As Martin Wilkinson and Andrew Moore 
have said, "Many people would not work if they were not paid; in that sense wages are 
inducements. Few people think that, as a result, it is wrong to offer wages." It therefore 
cannot be suggested that people act without giving informed consent each time they 
respond to such inducements.47 By participating in a commercial surrogacy arrangement, 
the commissioning parents receive the service they require, and the surrogate gets the 
monetary reward (among other rewards) that she wants. As inducement has resulted in 
everyone getting what they want, it can be seen that inducement can be a good thing.48 
45 Supra 39, pp 237. 
46 Ibid, pp 23 9-41. 
47 Martin Wilkinson and Andrew Moore, "Inducement in Research" Bioethics, volll, no 5, 1997, pp 373-
89, p 376. 
48 Idem. 
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4.2.5 Economic Status of Surrogates 
It is interesting considering the emphasis put on arguments that surrogacy will 
exploit poor women, that an American studl9 showed most surrogate mothers to be 
educated and middle class, and a UK study50 showed no surrogate mothers in dire 
financial circumstances. Andrews suggests most women become commercial surrogates 
because they want the money for things such as children's education, redecorating or a 
second car. 51 This casts further doubt on the claim that commercial surrogacy is 
exploitative, as these statistics suggest surrogates are generally not forced into 
commercial surrogacy due to poverty. 
4.2. 6 Transferring Burden of Risk 
It is also argued that surrogacy is exploitative because it involves one woman 
taking on the burden and risk of pregnancy for another. Indeed even with modem 
advances in technology and medicine, pregnancy is still a risky pursuit. However transfer 
of burden happens more often than we realise in everyday life. Laura Purdy notes several 
examples: house cleaning, hairdressing, dry-cleaning, agriculture, public works - where 
there are elevated risk rates from exposure to toxic chemicals or dangerous materials. 52 
The truth of the matter is that poor women already often have to choose between many 
elevated-risk jobs. While it would be preferable to improve those women's options, 
reducing their need to make such choices, it would in the mean-time be irrational to 
prevent them choosing contracted surrogacy which may be less risky and more enjoyable 
than their other options.53 The risks attached to pregnancy only strengthen the argument 
that surrogates should be adequately paid. 
49 H. Ragone, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994. 
50 E. Blyth, 'Section 30: the acceptable face of surrogacy?' (1993) 4 Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Lawp 248. 
51 Supra 23, p 284. 
52 Ed's Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Bioethics: An Anthology, Laura M. Purdy, "Surrogate Mothering: 
Exploitation or Empowerment?" Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1999, p 103, p 105. 
53 Supra 40, pp 109-10. 
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4.2. 7 Incommensurability 
It is sometimes argued that commercial surrogacy involves exchanging values that 
are incommensurable; in other words that the goods or services involved in the 
transaction have no common measure. However this sort of incommensurability does not 
necessarily show a transaction to be wrong. The example given by Wertheimer is that a 
"priceless" painting can be sold without claiming that the amount paid is commensurate 
with its value. Additionally, even if evidence of incommensurability does suggest a 
transaction is wrong, it does not prove a party is negatively affected by the transaction. 
There are some things, such as human beings, that are rightly believed to be truly 
incommensurable. This is why slavery and baby-selling are considered to be wrong. 
However, in most cases a thing's value will be largely subjective. Therefore ultimately it 
is up to individuals as to what amount they decide to accept as payment for the services 
they provide. Thus incommensurability alone does not show surrogacy to be 
1 . . 
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4.2.8 Reinforcing Inequalities of Gender 
If it is decided that surrogacy is in fact exploitative, it is not suddenly obvious that 
the practice should be prohibited. "A liberal democracy is not justified in prohibiting 
transactions just because the transactions are morally suspect or fail to incorporate the 
best conception ofhuman flourishing."55 According to John Stuart Mill, there needs to be 
harm to others. 56 It has been argued that even if surrogacy is not harmful overall to 
surrogates, it is harmful to women as a class as it reinforces inequalities of gender. This 
argument says commercial surrogacy will harm not just those who participate in it, but 
like prostitution, will oppress all women, by reinforcing certain prejudices and treatment 
of women. Richard J. Arneson summarizes the oppression of women argument in two 
ways. One variation of this argument states that tolerance of commercial surrogacy risks 
reinforcing the belief still held by some that domestic service is the only appropriate 
54 Ibid, p' 102. 
55 Ibid, pp 113-14, 
56 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p 13. 
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sphere for women, and therefore they should not participate fully in the public world of 
paid employment. The other variation argues that those who believe commercial 
surrogacy, like prostitution, is morally wrong, will see some women participating in it as 
evidence that women are inherently less virtuous than men, justifying the denial to 
women of some rights not denied to men. 57 However I agree with Arneson's response to 
these arguments - that we do not, and would not want to, banish other freedoms that are 
used by some people to reinforce the ideology of separate spheres for men and women. 
Arneson gives some examples: 
"When some teenaged women in America who face bleak life prospects 
choose to have babies, go on welfare, and drop out of school and the 
labor market, their choices may tend to reinforce the belief of many 
people that women's proper role is childbearing and childrearing. When 
women take part-time jobs rather than full-time jobs out of concern for 
their children or follow the "Mommy track" in their careers for the same 
reason, the ideology of separate spheres is reinforced in the minds of 
many men and women. But these possible negative effects of women's 
exercise of the freedom to control one's own reproductive life and the 
freedom to choose one's own career path do not constitute a prima facie 
case to abolish or curtail these liberties."58 
We should not restrict the freedoms of some for the sake of the narrow-mindedness of 
others. 
4.2.9 Regulation not Prohibition 
.Even if commercial surrogacy is exploitative to surrogates, it is not inevitable that 
the exploitativeness of a transaction justifies interfering with a transaction that the 
57 Supra 38, pp 162-3. 
58 Ibid, p 163. 
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exploited party benefits from. 59 At any rate, the worst exploitation could be curbed by 
setting a minimum wage. Despite the above argument, there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest surrogacy does reinforce social inequalities. Even if there was, prohibiting 
surrogacy would merely be burdening one class of women in order to benefit a larger 
class of women. Wertheimer points out that though we are often justified in imposing 
costs on one group in order to benefit another, it is harder to justify putting this burden on 
the least well-off among us, particularly when the costs are in the present and the benefits 
are in the future (and not even assured). Prohibiting surrogacy merely hides problems. 
Wertheimer summarizes, "suppressing mutually advantageous exploitative relationships 
may be akin to removing the homeless from public places; we may feel better, but the 
problem persists."60 
4.3 Commodification 
A third major objection that is commonly voiced against surrogacy is that it commodifies 
women and children. A commodity is something the exchange of which can be regulated 
by the market. Commodification is therefore the movement of something traditionally not 
thought to be subject to market norms, into the realm of the market. We may object to 
certain things being subject to market norms, or to being commodified. For example 
commodification of people through slavery is not accepted in today' s society. Likewise 
judicial decisions and votes are generally regarded as things that should not be for sale. 
Elizabeth Anderson says one problem with allowing certain things to be regulated by the 
market is that the market fails to value these things in an appropriate way. The 
appropriate way to treat a person, for example she says, is as being worthy of respect 
rather than merely worthy of use. A slave is treated as being of use, rather than worthy of 
respect. She describes this kind of respect as Kantian respect61 as it conforms to Kant's 
idea that we should treat human beings never only as a means to an end, but rather as an 
end in their own right. 
59 Supra 40, pp 113-4. 
60 Ibid, pp 120-1. 
61 Elizabeth Anderson, "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, Winter 1990, 
19:1, Academic Research Library, pp 71-92, p 72. 
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4.3.1 Degrading to Women and Children 
Anderson extends this line of argument to claim that commercial surrogacy treats 
women's labour in pregnancy and childbirth as a commodity, and as such degrades those 
women. She also claims the children that result from these arrangements are degraded by 
being reduced to the status of commodities because they are sold by the surrogate 
mother.62 Degradation occurs, claims Anderson, "when something is treated in 
accordance with a lower mode of valuation than is proper to it."63 
I disagree that commercial surrogacy agreements reduce children to commodities, 
as such arrangements do not involve the buying or selling of children. As for the 
commodification of procreational labour, I do not see this as necessarily a problem and 
the concern is born out of romanticised notions of women's experience of reproduction 
rather than the reality of it. 
4.3.2 Commercial Surrogacy does not constitute Baby-Selling 
The claim that children of commercial surrogacy agreements are reduced to 
commodities implies that these children are being bought and sold, and otherwise treated 
like commodities. This argument is often aimed against commercial surrogacy with 
different wording; it is claimed that commercial surrogacy is baby-selling because a fee is 
given to the surrogate, in exchange for which she hands the baby over. Baby-selling is 
contrary to Article 35 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,64 and it is 
generally agreed that baby-selling is a bad thing. One reason is that of Anderson's listed 
above regarding slavery. The claim that it treats the person sold with inappropriate 
respect is equally relevant here. The selling of babies implies that the buyers may treat 
the baby as property, and this is an inappropriate value to be given to a human being. 
62 Ibid, p 75, 77. 
63 Ibid, p 77. 
64 UNCROC (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) ratified byNZ in 1993, Article 35 states: "State 
Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, 
the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form." 
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Another reason baby-selling is generally abhorred is the instability it creates for the 
involved children. Once sold, if treated like property, they may be sold again, thus not 
providing a secure and stable environment for the child. 
However commercial surrogacy is not baby-selling because the baby is not able to 
be treated in the same way as other things we buy and sell. The baby cannot be on-sold 
and cannot be treated as property. If we say that what is happening is baby-selling, the 
result must be that the commissioning parents may treat the child as they do any other 
thing they pay for. They can act as though they own it and may do with it as they please. 
They may mistreat it, not provide for it, or on-sell it to the highest bidder. The fact that in 
reality commissioning parents may do none of these things is proof that commercial 
surrogacy is not baby-selling. Though there are some categories of things we may own 
and not treat any way we please - animals, historic buildings, trees - parents of a 
surrogate child (like all parents) are subject to far stricter moral and legal rules. Most 
notably the parents cannot transfer ownership of the child, as we may do with animals, 
historic buildings and trees. The parents are still subject to all laws regarding the welfare 
of children and may not treat the child as their property. The Care of Children Act 2004 is 
evidence of New Zealand law moving away from property type relationships when it 
comes to children. The replacement of custody and access orders by parenting orders 
shifts the emphasis from parental rights to parental responsibilities.65 Consequently the 
lack of evidence for the child being a commodity suggests that the money a surrogate 
mother receives when she hands over the child is for her labour rather than any 
transference of ownership. In other words, the fact that the commissioning parents do not 
receive a commodity is evidence that the surrogate did not sell them a child, but rather 
sold them her labour. 
The fee paid in commercial surrogacy arrangements can thus be seen as nothing 
other than payment for the service the surrogate provides. It is compensation for the 
conception, pregnancy and childbirth, that results in the commissioning parents gaining a 
65 Commentary on the Care of Children Act 2004 from Brookfields Lawyers, 
http://www.brookfields.co.nz/property law/latest plcn nov04.html#l, accessed 21/02/05. 
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baby. I say that results in the commissioning parents gaining a baby, because this is the 
point at which it is confirmed the surrogate was in fact performing the service for them. 
The parents should not have to pay the fee to the surrogate if she refuses to hand over the 
baby, despite her having performed the service of pregnancy. This is because while at the 
time she may have appeared, or even truly intended, to be performing a service for them, 
declining to relinquish the child proves that she was not. Keeping the baby gives her the 
benefit of the service rather than the commissioning parents. 
This does not apply to the situation where a child is stillborn, as this is due to no 
fault of the surrogate; she has fulfilled her duties as far as she is able, she has taken the 
time and endured the discomfort and risks, therefore she should still be paid. Contract 
clauses that exempted commissioning parents from paying a surrogate if the child was 
stillborn would make the payment look more like consideration for the baby than for a 
service. I argue that such clauses should be prohibited from commercial surrogacy 
contracts, as the surrogate should be paid, so long as she has provided the contracted 
service. 
Anderson argues, "That the mother regards only her labor and not her child as 
requiring compensation is also irrelevant. No one would argue that the baker does not 
treat his bread as property just because he sees the income from its sale as compensation 
for his labor and expenses and not for the bread itself, which he doesn't care to keep."66 
However she uses an inappropriate example; commercial surrogacy cannot be compared 
to a baker selling loaves because the loaf is a commodity while the baby is not. Therefore 
the distinction in what is being paid for is legitimate when made by the surrogate, but not 
when made by the baker. Since the fee in a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not a 
payment for the baby, there is no way that commercial surrogacy can be said to 
commodify children. The payment is for the service provided by the surrogate -
conception, pregnancy and childbirth - therefore this is the thing, if any, which is being 
commodified. But is this even a problem? 
66 Supra 61, p 78. 
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4.3.3 Does Commercial Surrogacy CommodifY Reproduction? 
Anderson claims that women are degraded when they act as commercial 
surrogates because the parental norms which are usually attached to gestation are 
replaced by economic norms common to the market. Anderson's problem with 
commercial surrogacy is that in the surrogacy contract, the surrogate "agrees not to form 
or to attempt to form a parent-child relationship with her offspring." Forming an 
attachment to the child - a norm of parenthood, is thus replaced by an agreement to form 
no special emotional ties, which Anderson describes as a norm of commercial production. 
Anderson claims "The demand to deliberately alienate oneself from one's love for one's 
own child is a demand which can reasonably and decently be made of no one."67 
I have three objections to Anderson's argument. She seems only to object to 
commercial, not compassionate surrogacy. Yet surrogates involved in either type of 
arrangement are likely to engage in the behaviour of attempting not to form significant 
ties to the child they are gestating, as a measure of self-protection. That this might be a 
difficult part of being a surrogate should be obvious to all who consider the option. Those 
who decide to become a surrogate despite this must believe the benefits (which may 
include giving an infertile couple the child they desperately desire, feelings of goodwill 
for helping others, and perhaps some kind of monetary benefit) outweigh this, and other 
risks. What Anderson seems to be concerned with is the commercial element; that in a 
commercial arrangement, this behaviour is more than self-protection, it is a contractual 
requirement. I however do not see the morality of the behaviour changed by its 
formalisation in a contract. Whether in a commercial or compassionate arrangement, an 
attempt not to form the same attachment to the child as one would one's own child, is 
beneficial to the surrogate and perhaps necessary for the arrangement to work. It is 
perhaps not something every woman could do, but then not all women should become 
surrogates. Believing oneself capable of handing over the baby at the end of the 
pregnancy is a necessary characteristic for potential surrogates, and is one that is 
sometimes (and should always be) screened for. Additionally, as Carson Strong points 
67 Ibid, p 82. 
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out, repressing one's feelings towards others is not necessarily degrading. Doctors and 
nurses caring for dying patients commonly distance themselves emotionally to preserve 
their own psychological health, without us considering their actions degrading.68 My 
objections therefore are: that the requirement to attempt not to form a strong bond to the 
child is a protective measure beneficial to surrogates, and one they need only agree to if 
they decide to become a surrogate (it is not just randomly demanded of any pregnant 
woman); that it is not a requirement particular to commercial surrogacy, nor does its 
formalisation in a contract change its nature significantly; and that repressing one's 
feelings toward others is not considered degrading in other contexts. Richard Arneson 
also points out, and I agree, that the contract does not require the surrogate to feel a 
certain way, but rather to act in a certain way,69 something common to most contracts. 
Despite rejecting Anderson's argument, we might still v1ew commercial 
surrogacy contracts as commodifying reproduction and women's labour. After all, the 
surrogate's labour is being exchanged for a fee. But why is this a problem? Is it because 
they are putting a value on, and charging for, the labour of their bodies? It cannot be, 
because this is what all human beings do when they go to work and get paid to do it. 
They agree that their labour is worth a particular amount, and sell it to their employer. To 
differentiate between gestational labour and other forms of physical or mental labour, 
more is needed than to argue that women have not traditionally been paid for this labour. 
It is convenient to a patriarchal society, and not a coincidence, that labour traditionally 
thought of as appropriate to the realm of altruism - reproduction, childcare, care of 
elderly, housework - is generally work done by women. If commercial surrogacy 
commodifies reproduction and women, then so does exchanging our physical or mental 
labour for a salary or wage commodify to a certain extent each of us who works. One 
must show the difference between reproduction and other forms of labour is more than 
merely symbolic or emotional in order to show commodification as problematic here. 
68 Carson Strong, Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine: A New Framework, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1997, p 107. 
69 Supra 38, p 132. 
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4.3.4 Is Reproduction Different to Other Types of Labour? 
One argument that does attempt to distinguish reproduction from other forms of 
labour is that which likens commercial surrogacy to prostitution. It is argued that while 
prostitution is sex without reproduction, surrogacy is reproduction without sex?0 
However at times opera singing, acting and dancing have also been compared to 
prostitution ("agreeable and beautiful talents" exploited for financial gain). This 
devaluing of physical labour is ironic considering all forms of employment involve 
payment for the use of some part of a person's body. It is argued that what is problematic, 
if this analogy is correct, aside from the moral distaste with which some regard 
prostitution, is the consequences that may result for society. Margaret Radin has argued 
that if sex were fully and openly commodified, "A change would occur in everyone's 
discourse about sex ... The open market might render subconscious valuation of women 
(and perhaps everyone) in sexual dollar value impossible to avoid."71 This slippery slope 
argument can, she says, equally be applied to commercial surrogacy; if commercial 
surrogacy becomes commonplace, all women might want to charge to reproduce, or start 
to value themselves according to what they think they could charge. As I am arguing that 
commercial surrogacy is not a bad thing, it would be unproblematic for it to become a 
prolific practice. But at any rate, this argument, like most slippery slope arguments, is 
both silly and alarmist. Since the decriminalization of prostitution in New Zealand, I have 
had no desire to charge money for sexual services, nor has the thought crossed my mind 
as to how much I might be worth if I did so desire. Additionally, a thing is typically 
valued more when gifted if there exists a choice to have sold it instead; it is more 
altruistic to gift something one might alternatively sell. On top of that, allocating a 
commercial value to women's labour may be one way to ensure equality. The Property 
Relationships Act commodifies, in a sense, having and caring for children, because it is 
treated as the equivalent of financial contribution in the context of a marriage partnership, 
thereby justifying the equal division of a couple's accumulated assets.72 
70 Supra 52, p 105. Obviously there are exceptions in both situations. 
71 Margaret Radin, "Market-Inalienability" Harvard Law Review, June 1987, 100:8, pp 1849-1936, p 1922. 
72 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 18: "(1) For the purposes of this Act, a contribution to the marriage 
or de facto relationship means all or any of the following: (a) the care of (i) any child of the marriage or 
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The comparison of commercial surrogacy to prostitution does nothing for the 
argument against commercial surrogacy. Firstly a definition that embraced prostitution 
and commercial surrogacy would likely also include some marriages.73 Secondly slippery 
slope arguments for either are not credible. And finally, as New Zealand has in fact 
decriminalized prostitution,74 the comparison suggests that we are being overly cautious 
in prohibiting commercial surrogacy. 
Another argument that attempts to distinguish procreational labour from other 
sorts of labour takes the opposite approach by elevating it, describing it as noble labour. 
To perform noble labour for pay is supposedly degrading and should therefore be banned. 
Arneson points out, and I agree, that "many kinds of work thought by many of us to be 
noble labour are nevertheless regarded as appropriately done for money." Nursing is one 
such example. He questions why noble women's labour should be treated differently.75 
As for the argument that selling such services is degrading, putting a value on 
one's own reproductive capabilities is not necessarily degrading as, "degradation very 
much depends on one's own perception of what is degrading."76 A notion of bodily 
integrity which suggests that in putting a value on the use of our body we are giving up 
what is human about us - our pricelessness - is just one opinion of humanity, and one that 
cannot justifiably be pressed onto all despite whether they believe this or not.77 An 
opinion by some that an activity is degrading is not justification for its prohibition. 
Dominic Wilkinson rightly claims that "laws that aim to restrict our ability to govern our 
child of the de facto relationship: ... (b) the management of the household and the performance of 
household duties: ... (2) There is no presumption that a contribution of a monetary nature ... is of greater 
value than a contribution of a non-monetary nature." 
73 Sexual or reproductive favours exchanged for compensation of some sort (perhaps financial support or 
the suggestion of an improved relationship). 
74 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s 7. 
75 Supra 38, p 153. 
76 Supra 37. 
77 Katharine McDonald, Could It Ever Be Ethical To CommodifY Organs? BITC 401, Theories of 
Bioethics, 2004, unpublished. 
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own moral integrity are in themselves demeaning."78 Even if we did view some practices, 
such as commercial surrogacy, as demeaning or degrading, this would not justify 
prohibition of such practices in a liberal society. Laws preventing individuals from 
demeaning or degrading themselves are paternalistic, whereas in a liberal society we 
should be adhering to John Stuart Mill's harm principle: "The only purpose for which 
power can rightly be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his 
will is to prevent harm to others."79 We allow paternalism to interfere with people's 
liberty occasionally when their actions may harm themselves, but such paternalism is not 
justified merely to prevent a person being demeaned or degraded. 
4.4 Altruism 
Another way it is claimed commercial surrogacy harms those other than its participants is 
through its contribution to the deterioration of altruism in society. It is assumed that the 
legalization of commercial surrogacy will decrease the likelihood of women acting as 
surrogates in compassionate surrogacy arrangements, as most surrogates will choose to 
charge for their services. This argument is similar to the argument against allowing the 
selling of blood products. Peter Singer notes that even if a voluntary program for giving 
blood existed along side commercial blood banks, "The fact that blood is a commodity, 
that if no one gives it, it can still be bought, makes altruism unnecessary, and so loosens 
the bonds that can otherwise exist between strangers in the community. 80 Thus it is 
argued that as having the option to be commercial surrogates will see fewer people 
choosing to be compassionate surrogates, this will decrease altruism in the community in 
general and therefore the option of commercial surrogacy should not be allowed. This 
argument for prohibiting commercial surrogacy can be countered in three ways. 
78 Dominic J C Wilkinson, "Selling Organs and Souls: Should the State Prohibit 'Demeaning' Practices?" 
Journal ofBioethical Inquiry, vol. 1 no. 1, pp 27-31, p 27. 
79 Supra 56. 
80 Peter Singer, "Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of Health Care," in Markets and Morals, pp 
163-6. as cited in Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, p 71. 
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4.4.1 Artificial Altruism 
Firstly, while it is generally agreed that altruism is a good thing, its 'goodness' 
does not justify manipulation to bring it about. Imposing restrictions on people to stop 
them selling their reproductive services does not stop them wanting to sell these services. 
Therefore an artificial culture of altruism is set up. People refrain from getting involved 
in commercial surrogacy arrangements not because of feelings of altruism, but rather due 
to legal restrictions. The overall result may be that only altruistic compassionate 
surrogacy occurs, but numbers of surrogacy arrangements drop drastically. Altruism is a 
good thing, but it is not an appropriate thing for governments to manipulate. Is altruism 
not more genuine and meaningful when it occurs naturally? 
4.4.2 Loss of Some Altruism an Acceptable Loss 
My second objection to using altruism to justify prohibiting commercial 
surrogacy is that many other areas that previously existed in the realm of altruism have 
become market based. A.S. Daar notes that these include day care for children and 
nursing homes for the elderly. He also points out that incentives exist in other areas, for 
example tax breaks for donations to charities and the monetary reward that comes with 
Nobel prizes, without removing all elements of altruism that have traditionally been 
found in these areas. 81 Forcing reproduction to remain purely altruistic exploits those 
women who do not wish it to remain as such. 
4.4.3 Unrecognized Altruism 
My third objection is that this argument ignores the fact that altruism can and does 
exist in commercial surrogacy arrangements. While financial incentives are usually one 
reason listed by commercial surrogates for their becoming a surrogate, a desire to help 
childless couples is another reason. One commercial surrogate explained her motivation 
with these words: "I'm not going to cure cancer or become Mother Theresa, but a baby is 
81 A. S. Daar, 'Rewarded Gifting', Transplantation Proceedings, Oct 1992, 24(5), pp 2207-11, p 2209-10. 
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one thing I can sort of give back, something I can give to someone who couldn't have it 
any other way."82 Another commercial surrogate had similar reasons: "I don't do 
anything that changes the world. You know I'm not a doctor or a nurse, I don't do 
anything that's important but I feel I've achieved something with my life and I've done it 
very well."83 A recent surrogate mother decided not to take the arranged $20,000 fee 
when she found out she was pregnant with quintuplets, all boys. She felt that the new 
parents would need the money more. 84 Financial compensation may in fact make it easier 
for many surrogates to perform the altruistic act of giving the gift of a child. Surrogacy is 
a good and generous act; involving money does not dissolve this good. 
That commercial surrogacy weakens altruism in society is not an argument that 
can justify prohibiting commercial surrogacy. This is because altruism is only meaningful 
when it is not forced and manipulated; we have not stopped other activities traditionally 
associated with altruism moving to a more market based structure; and this argument 
totally ignores the elements of altruism that do exist in commercial surrogacy. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the major arguments against commercial surrogacy: harm to 
children; exploitation; commodification; and loss of altruism, are insufficient to justify 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy. Many of the harms to children it is claimed that 
allowing commercial surrogacy would risk are either insubstantial risks, or are untrue. 
The remaining risks apply equally either to all children, or to children born of 
compassionate surrogacy arrangements. As we do not deem those risks that apply to all 
children sufficient to ban reproduction, nor are they a satisfactory argument for banning 
commercial surrogacy. Additionally those arguments that apply to compassionate 
82 Barbara Kantrowitz, "Who Keeps Baby M?" Newsweek, 19 January 1987, pp 44-49, as cited in Martha 
Field, Surrogate Motherhood, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988, p20, as cited in Richard 
J. Arneson, "Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy'' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Spring 1992, 
21 :2, Academic Research Library, pp 111-64, p 154. 
83 Carole Horlock after her eighth surrogate pregnancy. "Britain's Busiest Surrogate Mother" screened 
channel one, tvnz, 13th December 2004. 
84 American surrogate Theresa Anderson, in a news article screened on One News, TVNZ, 14th April2005. 
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surrogacy, which is legal in New Zealand, have not been seen as a justification for 
banning the practice, and nor should they here. 
In regard to the argument that commercial surrogacy is exploitative, I have 
disputed that the practice is necessarily exploitative. I have also shown that even where 
exploitation does exist, it is not necessarily problematic when the agreement still benefits 
both parties. As I believe that within the protection of regulation, commercial surrogacy 
will usually benefit both parties, any evidence of exploitation does not justify prohibiting 
this kind of surrogacy. 
As for the argument that commercial surrogacy commodifies children, I have 
disagreed that this is true because the practice does not amount to baby-selling. This is 
because the fee that the commissioning parents pay to a surrogate is purely for the service 
she provides them with, rather than as consideration for the child. I have accepted that 
commercial surrogacy might validly be viewed as commodifying women's labour, 
however I have argued that this is not problematic. That is because slippery slope 
arguments resulting from this belief are not realistic, and any idea that commodification 
of the body is degrading ignores the fact that most people commodify their bodies in 
some way, and it is up to the individual to decide if she is being degraded. 
The argument that commercial surrogacy reduces altruism in the community does 
not recognize that prohibition would only boost altruism in an artificial way. Additionally 
it does not acknowledge that altruism exists in other areas that have been commodified, 
and particularly that altruism can and does occur in commercial surrogacy arrangements. 
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Chapter 5: Regulation not Prohibition: Legal Recommendations for Surrogacy 
Having shown the reasons why commercial surrogacy is a good thing, and then dismissed 
the arguments against it, I shall in this chapter examine the legal changes that would need 
to be made if commercial surrogacy were made legal in New Zealand. I shall discuss the 
legal problems that arise specifically in commercial surrogacy arrangements. I will 
scrutinize the options for enforcing (or not enforcing) commercial surrogacy contracts, 
and examine what restrictions there should be on such contracts. I shall also look at the 
possibilities and necessities for regulation, including a regulatory proposal from the Law 
Commission that I favour. 
5.1 Enforcing Contracts 
If New Zealand law were to make commercial surrogacy legal, the status of commercial 
surrogacy contracts would have to be established. Surrogacy agreements are currently 
unenforceable. That includes compassionate surrogacy arrangements. Commercial 
surrogacy arrangements are not only unenforceable they are illegal. The giving or 
receiving of valuable consideration is an offence punishable by up to a year in prison or a 
$100,000 fine. If commercial surrogacy were to be legalised, this law would have to be 
amended. At the very least the prohibition on valuable consideration would have to be 
removed. The status of surrogacy contracts is most relevant where the contractual 
agreement breaks down. While this seldom happens, 1 it can be a very difficult situation 
when it does, as evidenced by the two cases discussed below. I will discuss the 
possibilities for what kind of legal status such a contract might have, including its current 
illegal status, and explore the advantages and/or disadvantages that pertain to each one. 
1 Elizabeth Anderson, "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, Winter 1990, 
19:1, Academic Research Library, pp 71-92, p 88. Also, Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of 
Reproductive Technology, Lori B. Andrews, "The Challenge for Feminists" Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1992, pp 205-19, p 209. Andrews notes that 75% of biological mothers who give a child up for 
adoption-later change their minds, whereas only around 1% of surrogates have similar changes of heart. See 
also Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Case Studies, "The Case of Baby M: 
Parenting Through Contract When Everyone Wants the Child" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 
pp 317-34, p 330. And Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart 
Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 264, footnote 12. 
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These possibilities are: criminalisation; unenforceability; assimilation into adoption law; 
enforceable with specific performance; and enforceable with damages. 
Contracts for compassionate surrogacy, while not illegal in New Zealand, are not 
enforceable.2 So while the payments allowed under the HART Act 2004 may be 
legitimately paid, and the transfer of the child is permissible, neither the payments nor the 
transference of custody can be legally enforced if either party reneges on the agreement. 
If commercial surrogacy were to be allowed, commercial surrogacy contracts might be 
given the same unenforceable status. I believe some terms of a commercial surrogacy 
contract should be enforceable, in order to provide some security to the parties. However, 
making the contract enforceable would imply that the term specifying that the surrogate 
will hand over the child to the commissioning parents may be enforced even if the 
surrogate changes her mind. Along with the idea that payments commodify women and 
children, the idea that women may be forced, due to a contract, to give up a child they 
love, is one of the primary issues concerning people over commercial surrogacy. I have 
dismissed the arguments relating to payments, and will discuss the options for the legal 
status of a commercial surrogacy contract in light of whether those options will uphold 
contractual promises to pay. However, I will also point out that making the contract 
enforceable does not necessarily imply that an agreement's terms, for things such as 
giving up a child, are strictly enforceable. I will conclude that perhaps the only way for 
commercial surrogacy to work, is if some terms are enforceable and others are not, with 
legislation specifying accordingly. 
5.2 What Can Go Wrong 
Two well-known cases are examples of what can go wrong in a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement. The Baby M & Malahoff cases show commercial surrogacy at its worst, and 
demonstrate the need for legal guidance in relation to commercial surrogacy contracts. 
2 HART Act 2004 sl4(1) "A surrogacy arrangement is not of itself illegal, but is not enforceable by or 
against any person." 
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5.2.1 When Everyone Wants the Child 
The Baby M case occurred in New York in the mid 80's. Mrs Whitehead agreed 
to be artificially inseminated with Mr Stem's sperm. She was to receive $10,000 in 
addition to all the costs of the pregnancy. Mrs Whitehead gave birth to a healthy baby 
girl, but decided not to give her up. The Stems obtained a court order for temporary 
custody but the Whiteheads evaded police for three and a half months. When found they 
were forced to hand over "Baby M", as she had become known, while permanent custody 
was determined by the Courts. 
Just after Baby M turned one, a judge of the New Jersey Superior Court held the 
surrogacy contract valid and enforceable. Mr Stem was awarded permanent custody, Mrs 
Whitehead's parental rights were completely terminated, and the judge processed Mrs 
Stem's adoption of the child without the Whiteheads' knowledge. The judge ruled that 
specific performance of the contract was appropriate as long as it was in the child's best 
interests. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision 
regarding the validity of the contract and the complete termination of Mrs Whitehead's 
parental rights. The custody order was not overturned, based on the best interests of the 
child, but Mrs Whitehead remained the legal mother and gained weekly visitation rights.3 
It has been suggested that Mrs Whitehead was not selected as a surrogate for the 
Stems' because of her capability to be a surrogate, but rather due to her physical 
resemblance to Mrs Stem.4 It later became known that a psychologist had raised concerns 
regarding Mrs Whitehead's ambivalence about giving up the child prior to the surrogacy 
proceeding, but this information was not passed on to the Stems. Also Steinbock notes 
3 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Case Studies, "The Case of Baby M: 
Parenting Through Contract When Everyone Wants the Child" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 
pp317-34. 
4 Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death of a 
Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New York, 
1992, pp 277-97, p 282. 
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"the case seems to have been mismanaged from start to finish and could serve as a 
manual of how not to arrange a surrogate birth."5 
5.2.2 When No-one Wants the Child 
The Malahoffcase occurred in New York in the early 80's. Mrs Stiver agreed to 
be artificially inseminated with the sperm of Mr Malahoff. It was agreed Mrs Stiver 
would receive $10,000 in addition to medical costs for her role. After the birth of a baby 
boy Mrs Stiver and Mr Malahoff signed the birth certificate as legal parents. It became 
apparent that the boy was microcephalic, a condition that often indicates mental 
retardation. He also had a severe strep infection, which threatened to cause loss of 
hearing and eyesight and further mental retardation. The Stivers were paid their $10,000, 
but before they cashed the cheque, blood tests suggested Mr Malahoffwas not the child's 
father. The cheque was returned and dispute arose over custody and responsibility for the 
child. 
Both sets of parents refused responsibility for the child. It was then revealed on 
the Phil Donahue Show that tests established conclusively that Mr Malahoff was not the 
father. It emerged that while the Stivers had abstained from sexual intercourse for the 30 
days post-insemination, they hadnot been told, or did not understand, that intercourse 
shortly before insemination could result in a pregnancy that would not necessarily be 
revealed by the pre-insemination pregnancy test. When it was proved the child was 
biologically theirs, the Stivers accepted him. When he was three he was entered into a 
therapy centre as his capabilities would never proceed past that of a two to four month 
old. Several suits were filed against physicians, in part for improper instructions before 
insemination. It was reported Mr Malahoff thought a child would repair his marriage. He 
separated from his wife shortly after the birth of the child.6 
5 Bonnie Steinbock, "Surrogate Motherhood as Pre-natal Adoption" Law, Medicine and Health Care, 1988, 
16, pp 44-50, p 45. As cited in Ed. 's Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas, Surrogate 
Motherhood: International Perspectives, Robert J Edelmann, "Psychological Assessment in 'Surrogate' 
Motherhood Relationships", Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, pp 143-159, p 147. 
6 Ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Case Studies, "When No One Wants the 
Child" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 335-7. 
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It appears inadequate preparation and advice, and questionable motives were the 
catalysts for the breakdown of these commercial surrogacy agreements. While regulation, 
including requirements for screening, counselling and adequate advice, may have 
prevented these situations, there will always be a risk of disputes. Therefore an effective 
regulatory scheme setting out the status of commercial surrogacy contracts and aimed at 
resolving disputes will be necessary if commercial surrogacy is permitted. 
5.3 Possibilities for Contract 
5. 3.1 Criminalisation - the Current Approach 
Criminalisation is the current New Zealand approach to commercial surrogacy. Section 
14 of the HART Act makes it an offence to give or receive payment for participation in a 
surrogacy arrangement (other than for reasonable and necessary expenses as are listed). 
Committing such an offence can result in imprisonment for up to a year, or a fine of up to 
$100,000, or both. This option goes against the advice of the Bioethics Council, a 
Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Law 
Commission,7 and runs against the trends of other countries. For example, the UK has 
decided it is not in the best interests of children, born of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements, to "be subject to the taint of criminality". 8 I cannot see where the benefit is 
7 In their Submission to the Health Select Committee on the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology 
("HART") Bill SOP No. 80, the Bioethics Council recommended that commercial surrogacy arrangements 
not be prohibited before there had been sufficient time to elicit the views of the public on the topic. 
http://www.bioethics.org.nz/publications/hmi-submission-jul03/ accessed 23/02/05. A 1994 Ministerial 
Committee recommended that apart from certain changes regarding providers and potential providers of 
assisted reproduction and surrogacy services, "no criminal offences in relation to surrogacy should be 
created." Bill Atkin & Paparanga Reid, "Assisted human Reproduction: Navigating Our Future" Report of 
the Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, July 1994, Crown Copyright, 
Wellington, Summary of Options pp 1, 4. The Law Commission favours regulation over prohibition, "The 
issue of exploitation is not in itself sufficient to compel the prohibition or criminalisation of surrogacy 
agreements, commercial or otherwise." Law Commission, Report 65, "Adoption and Its Alternatives: A 
Different Approach and a New Framework" Wellington, September 2000, p 195, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publicationsR65ado.PDF, accessed 26/03/05. 
8 Department of Health and Social Security, United Kingdom, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology, London, HMSO, July 1984, p 47. As cited in ed. Kenneth D. Alpern, 
The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, Rosemarie Tong, "The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: 
Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements" Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 277-97, p 280. 
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to a child in imprisoning their parents for up to a year (whichever persons end up being 
their parents), or crippling their family with a $100,000 fine, thus making it harder for 
them to support a child. These penalties seem excessive and against the best interests of 
the child. While they are clearly intended to have a deterrent effect, they would only be 
imposed after a child had been born. Jackson notes that the threat of criminal prosecution 
has had little deterrent effect in Australia.9 In New Zealand it would not be difficult for 
some commercial surrogacy arrangements to be carried out in secret, thus getting around 
the law. 10 This option pushes commercial surrogacy underground or forces couples 
overseas, therein denying them, and other parties involved the protection and safety of 
I . 11 regu atwn. 
One negative result of couples being forced overseas to access commercial 
surrogacy is that it will make it harder for surrogate children to know their genetic or 
gestational origins. New Zealand has traditionally encouraged openness in situations 
where sperm donation is used. However such openness in surrogate relationships will be 
hindered if there is great geographical distance between the family and the donor(s) 
and/or surrogate. 12 A negative of driving commercial surrogacy underground, is that 
participants may feel the illegality of their actions makes it too risky to consult medical or 
legal professionals for advice or assistance. This may result in anything from badly 
organised agreements, which might cause tension or conflict, to the safety of the child or 
the surrogate being endangered. 
9 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 
200 I, p 307, footnote 229. 
10 Artificial insemination at home would be difficult to detect, as would payments to the surrogate. Formal 
adoption by the commissioning couple would be more problematic, but this would not stop the child from 
living with the couple. The Law Commission has noted the occurrence of a surrogate mother registering 
under the commissioning mother's name on the birth certificate, Law Commission, Report 65, "Adoption 
and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New Framework" Wellington, September 2000, p 203, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publicationsR65ado.PDF, accessed 26/03/05. 
11 Restrictions on surrogacy in Australia have resulted in growing numbers of infertile Australian couples 
going to the US in order to enter surrogacy arrangements. Margaret Otlowski, "Re Evelyn: Reflections on 
Australia's first Litigated Surrogacy Case" Medical Law Review vol. 7 no. 1, 1999, pp 38-57, p 57. 
12 Bill Atkin & Paparanga Reid, "Assisted Human Reproduction: Navigating Our Future" Report of the 
Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, July 1994, Crown Copyright, Wellington, 
pp 110-11. 
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The UK approach has been to punish the middlemen involved in commercial 
surrogacy arrangements, such as lawyers, doctors, and social workers, rather than the 
primary participants. As I believe commercial surrogacy is a legitimate action, I do not 
believe those who assist the commissioning couple and the surrogate should be punished. 
Particularly when they are the persons most able to provide the necessary advice and 
assistance to those involved in the arrangement. Therefore while regulation is necessary, 
making commercial surrogacy illegal is not advantageous. 
5.3.2 Unenforceability 
If the prohibition was lifted on commercial surrogacy, one option would be to 
leave commercial surrogacy contracts unenforceable, as is currently the case for 
compassionate surrogacy contracts. In the case of a breakdown between the parties this 
option would mean the State would leave the parties as it found them (except for the child 
that is, whose situation would be decided by the best interests test). 13 This option means 
there is no security for either party. There is nothing to stop the surrogate changing her 
mind and keeping the baby, nor the commissioning couple changing their minds and 
rejecting the baby (of which there is a higher risk if the child is not healthy), or not 
paying the surrogate the agreed fee. This option just does not seem fair as it may leave 
the commissioning couple without a child, and out of pocket, or it may leave the 
surrogate unpaid, and/or with a child she never had any intention of raising; leaving her 
either with the burden of raising an unwanted child, or the responsibility for arranging 
adoption (which might be difficult if the child is not healthy). For these reasons this 
option is certainly not favourable. 
5.3.3 Assimilation into Adoption Law 
Another option is to assimilate commercial surrogacy into the area of adoption 
law. Compassionate surrogacy is currently dealt with under adoption law. This option 
would permit the payment of reasonable expenses to the surrogate, but would be less 
13 Supra 4, p 278. 
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open to the paying of fees, as the Adoption Act 1955 does not allow payments in 
consideration of adoption. 14 What this option would also allow is a "change of heart 
period" for the surrogate, meaning she could change her mind about conferring 
parenthood, even after handing over the child, but before signing the adoption papers. 15 
Under the Adoption Act, the mother's written consent to adoption is not admissible 
unless the child is at least 10 days old at the time the mother gives that consent. 16 The 
equivalent law in the UK gives a surrogate six weeks to change her mind. 17 This element 
of adoption law might perhaps be useful to commercial surrogacy (as I will discuss 
below), but total assimilation into adoption law would not remedy all problems in 
commercial surrogacy, and would be inappropriate in so far as adoption law rejects 
payments being made. 
5.3.4 Enforceable with Specific Performance 
Another option is to hold the contract enforceable, and let the court grant either 
party specific performance. This means the party attempting to break the contract would 
be forced to fulfil their contractual obligations, thus providing more certainty for the 
contractual parties. It is not an uncommon argument that specific performance should be 
the ordinary remedy for surrogacy contract disputes. 18 Much of the public opinion in the 
Baby M case felt that this was the clear-cut remedy for the breach of contract. 19 However 
specific performance as a remedy is at the discretion of the Court, and the Court will 
consider several things in deciding whether to grant it. Specific performance was 
14 Adoption Act 1955, s25(1): "Except with the consent of the Court, it shall not be lawful for any person to 
give or receive any payment or reward in consideration of the adoption or proposed adoption of a child or 
in consideration of the making arrangements for an adoption or proposed adoption." 
15 Supra 4, p 280. 
16 Adoption Act 1955, s7( 4)(7). 
17 Adoption and Children Act 2002 s47(4)(b): a condition of an adoption order being made is "the child was 
placed for adoption with the consent of each parent or guardian and the consent of the mother was given 
when the child was at least six weeks old." 
18 Marjorie Shultz, for example, argues that failing to give effect to the intentions of the parties "is to 
disregard one of the most distinctive traits that makes us human ... To disregard such intention with 
reference to so intimate and significant an activity as procreation and child-rearing is deeply shocking." She 
believes that "specific performance of agreements about parenthood in some sense confirms core values 
about the uniqueness oflife." Shultz, "Reproductive Technology and Intention-based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality" Wisconsin Law Review vol. 2, pp297-398, pp 377-8, 364. As cited in 
Jackson, Supra 9, p 313. 
19 Supra 3, p 319. 
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traditionally considered if damages were unlikely to be adequate, however the 
appropriateness of the remedy in the particular circumstances is more often considered 
now, rather than just viewing specific performance as a secondary altemative?0 
The best interests of the child are always the primary consideration. Therefore as 
noted above, for public policy reasons a contract could not be the sole determinant for the 
placement of the child. However, if the court decided placement with the commissioning 
couple was in the child's interests, they could go ahead with considering a remedy of 
specific performance. If the child's best interests were obviously favoured by granting 
custody to the commissioning parents, then it would appear that the contract had nothing 
to do with the decision; it would merely seem that the best interests test happened to give 
the same result as the contract. However, in a situation where the child's best interests 
seemed equally favoured by granting custody to either set of parents, specific 
performance of the contract could be the deciding factor. 
One thing that the Court considers, when deciding whether to grant specific 
performance, is whether the contract is for personal services. Based on the idea that it is 
undesirable, and usually impossible, to compel an unwilling party to maintain continuous 
personal relations with another, specific performance will normally not be granted for a 
contract for personal services.21 A commercial surrogacy contract is a contract for 
personal services. However it is different to most personal service contracts in that the 
child is separable from the contracted mother.22 Because of this, the surrogate would be 
able to uphold her part of the contract without having to maintain continuous personal 
relations in the future. 
Another consideration is the principle of mutuality. Under this principle, the 
possibility of specific performance is based on whether the other party could also demand 
specific performance.23 This would be relevant, as if the surrogate could be forced to 
20 Burrows, Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in NZ, Wellington, Butterworths, 1997, p 766. 
21 Ibid, p 768. 
22 Supra'!-, p 279. 
23 Supra 20, p 771. 
68 
relinquish the child against her will, so could the commissioning couple be forced to 
receive a child they no longer wanted. Forcing a couple to adopt a child they no longer 
wanted would obviously not be in the best interests of the child. A Court would therefore 
be unlikely to make such an order, and for this reason, specific performance would not 
appear to be appropriate for resolving commercial surrogacy contract problems. 
The other major factor for a Court considering specific performance in these 
circumstances would be hardship to the defendant (the person who has broken the 
contract). Specific performance will not be ruled out merely because it would be 
disadvantageous to the defendant, rather it must cause him/her severe hardship. An 
example is where the cost of performance to the defendant is out of all proportion to the 
benefit the plaintiff will receive.24 The harm to a surrogate mother who must unwillingly 
give up her child is not necessarily out of proportion to the joy of a couple who receives 
their long-desired-for child. Equally the harm to a couple who are forced to adopt a child 
they do not want is not necessarily out of proportion with the harm to a surrogate mother 
forced to keep a child she never intended to raise. However despite not being out of 
proportion, these hardships would still be considered significant. Thus for this reason as 
well, specific performance does not seem a suitable relief for a broken commercial 
surrogacy contract. 
5.3.5 Partially Enforceable with Damages 
Upon the breaking of a contract, the other available remedy is for the court to 
award damages. Such damages should reflect what the plaintiff has lost due to the failure 
of the defendant to perform the contract.25 This option would give the surrogate a choice. 
She could choose to break the contract and keep the child, knowing that she would then 
likely have to pay damages to the commissioning couple. This could not remain an option 
for the .surrogate indefinitely; she could not change her mind years later and demand the 
return of the child. This is where a "change of heart period" could come in. There would 
24 1bid, p 767. 
25 1bid, p 774. 
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be a set number of days or weeks, before which any consent to adoption would not be 
valid. After that period, consent to adopt given by the surrogate would be valid and 
binding, and she would no longer be able to renege on the contract. 
One of the biggest problems many people have with commercial surrogacy is the 
idea that a contract can force a surrogate to hand over a child she has unintentionally 
become attached to and no longer wants to give up. Larry Gostin argues that "the rights 
of a gestational mother to make future decisions about her body, lifestyle and an intimate 
future relationship with her child are so important to her dignity and human happiness 
that they should be regarded as inalienable. "26 A "change of heart period" would solve 
this issue. Whether it would be 10 days before a consent to adoption be deemed valid, as 
per current New Zealand adoption law, or six weeks as in the UK, or somewhere in 
between, 27 the surrogate would only have to hand over the child if she was still sure about 
doing so, after having given birth. Specific performance would no longer be an option for 
enforcing the contract, thus also avoiding the public policy issue. An adoption would 
only go ahead if the surrogate still wanted it to, therefore placement of the child would be 
according to the mother's wishes, rather than the terms of a contract. The best interests of 
the child would therefore only be relevant in deciding the fitness of the adopting couple 
to be parents, as is the case with any adoption, as there would be no argument about 
which of two sets of parents would be more suitable. If a dispute arose after consent had 
been given, the mother would no longer have an absolute right to change her mind. 
Instead her right would be qualified by the best interests test, and placement of the child 
would likely depend on whether it had bonded with the new family. British case law on 
mothers who initially consent to adoption and later change their mind shows that the 
court's overriding concern will be to protect the welfare of the child by avoiding 
d
. . 28 1srupt10n. 
26 Ed Larry Gostin, Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy, Larry Gostin, "A Civil Liberties Analysis 
of Surrogacy Arrangements" Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana UP, pp 3-23, p 14. 
27 The Law Commission has recommended a period of28 days. Law Commission, Report 65, "Adoption 
and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New Framework" Wellington, September 2000, p 222, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publicationsR65ado.PDF, accessed 26/03/05. 
28 Re H (Infants) (Adoption: Parental Consent) [1977] 1 WLR 471 andRe A (Adoption: Change of Mind) 
[2000] 1 FLR 665, as cited in Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law Technology and Autonomy, 
Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2001, p 311. 
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Jackson notes that allowing the surrogate to change her mind about giving up the 
child would not require the entire contract to be unenforceable.29 The contract could 
remain enforceable in terms of paying money owed to parties upon fulfilment of 
contractual terms, and responsibilities of the parties. Thus the court could grant damages 
to the commissioning couple, as a result of not receiving the child. These damages would 
return to them any money already paid to the surrogate, and compensate for any other 
costs incurred in relation to the broken arrangement. 
The court could enforce the payment of a fee to a surrogate who had fulfilled her 
role, or order the return of payments that had been made to her, if she decided to keep the 
child. The court could also order the commissioning couple to pay damages if they 
changed their minds about adopting, or hold them responsible for arranging an alternate 
adoption. If the child were not able to be adopted out, perhaps due to disability, the 
couple might have to pay damages to cover the cost of raising the child. In relation to 
wrongful birth claims (where the birth of a child results from medical negligence), it has 
not been decided in New Zealand whether to follow the English approach of no liability 
for the ordinary costs of rearing a child,30 or the Australian approach, which does allow 
such claims. 31 Therefore it is unclear what the New Zealand response on this issue would 
be in relation to commercial surrogacy. As foreseeability is relevant in determining the 
extent of responsibility of the negligent doctor in medical negligence cases,32 I believe 
there may be more reason to hold commissioning parents liable for the costs of raising a 
child they decide to reject, as surely it is more foreseeable that their actions would 
amount to this unexpected cost for the surrogate. 
29 Supra 9, p 308. 
30 In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 AllER 961, it was held that damages for the cost of 
raising a healthy child can not be recovered. In Parkinson v StJames and Seacraft University Hospital NHS 
Trust [2001] 3 AllER 97, damages were awarded for the child's special needs and care relating to his 
disability, but this did not extend to the basic costs of his maintenance. 
31 Melchior v Cattanach [2001] Aust Torts Reps 81-591 (Qld SC), [2001] QCA 246 (unreported 26 June 2001, BC 
2001 03372) (Qld CA). 
32 C. M. Thomas, Claims for Wrongful Pregnancy and Child Rearing Expenses, Discussion Paper Series 
213, School of Accountancy, College of Business, Massey University, Palmerston North, September 2002, 
http://www-accountancy.massey.ac.nz/docs!Oiscussion%20Paper/213.pdf, accessed 17/04/05, p 2. 
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If the commissioning parents changed their minds about becoming parents of a 
child, the damages they would be ordered to pay could be significantly higher than those 
a surrogate would be expected to pay if she changed her mind about handing over the 
child. This comes down to the need to provide for the upbringing of the child, and the 
motivations of the parties for changing their minds. A surrogate is likely to have changed 
her mind because she has become attached to the child and does not feel emotionally able 
to part with it. The commissioning parents are more likely to have changed their minds 
about becoming parents, which at this late stage of proceedings is highly irresponsible, or 
have rejected the baby perhaps due to a disability, which is far less admirable than the 
surrogate's reasons. I recognise of course that there may be exceptions to these 
assumptions (for example a surrogate may threaten to keep the child unless she is paid 
more money), and of course a Court would consider the actual circumstances when 
deciding damages. 
Tong notes the practical disadvantages of a damages approach. She suggests that 
as surrogates are generally less wealthy than contracting couples, they will have 
difficulties paying the damages the Court orders them to pay.33 While surrogates are 
generally less wealthy than the contracting couple, Tong is assuming that surrogates are 
usually poor, a claim that I noted in chapter three is often not true. Additionally adequate 
counselling before entering a surrogacy agreement would necessarily cover these sorts of 
risks, so that a potential surrogate would be forced to consider this. Tong also asserts that 
money will not adequately compensate the childless commissioning couple, or the 
surrogate left with a child she never intended to keep.34 While this is true, it may just 
have to. be accepted that this is an element of commercial surrogacy that people will have 
to risk if they want to become involved in the practice. 
This option would avoid the problems of forcing a surrogate by contract to give 
up a child she wanted to keep. It would also circumvent the public policy issue. At the 
same time it would provide more security for the contracting parties, as the other 
33 Supra 4, p 279. 
34 Idem. 
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contractual elements, such as payments, would be guaranteed, and damages would be a 
remedy. Though this remedy might seem less ideal to the parties than specific 
performance, it would be significantly better than leaving the contract completely 
unenforceable. For these reasons I see this option as most suitable for dealing with 
commercial surrogacy contracts in New Zealand. This approach would also be suitable 
for compassionate surrogacy, so that where there was an agreement to pay expenses, the 
agreement could be enforced, but the surrogate could still change her mind about giving 
up the child. 
5.4 How Far Can a Contract Go? 
Another issue relating to commercial surrogacy contracts is just what kind of terms it is 
permissible to include. Is it acceptable to set terms that require the surrogate to eat only 
healthy foods and refrain from drinking or smoking? What about requiring that the 
surrogate will breastfeed the child for a certain time after birth? May the commissioning 
couple require the surrogate to have prenatal testing, and if the result is unsatisfactory, 
may they force her to have an abortion? 
One argument against the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements is that 
contracts are overly restrictive of individual liberty. Mary Lyndon Shanley has argued 
that "pregnancy contracts might ... usefully be compared to contracts for consensual 
slavery."35 However Jackson rightly notes that this parallel is a weak one, as the 
commissioning couple cannot be said to own the surrogate. She also notes that John 
Stuart Mill's objection to a person selling themselves into slavery was that, in that one 
action of exercising autonomy, a person precluded any future capacity for exercising 
autonomy. The difference with a contract for commercial surrogacy is that the contract is 
for a finite period of time, not unlike many other contracts for services where a person 
surrenders some portion of their liberty in return for something they consider more 
35 Ed Patricia Boling, Expecting Trouble: Surrogacy, Fetal Abuse and New Reproductive Technologies, 
Oxford, Westview, Mary Lyndon Shanley, "'Surrogate Mothering' and Women's Freedom: A Critique of 
Contracts for Human Reproduction" pp 156-67, p 165. As cited in Jackson, Supra 9, p 312, footnote 243. 
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valuable (after all, that is the point of a contract).36 This shows that contractual terms, 
which limit the surrogate's liberty in some way, are not automatically unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, some clauses could amount to an undue restriction on a surrogate's 
autonomy. A requirement that a surrogate undergo prenatal tests, or have an abortion if 
the foetus proved abnormal would interfere with the bodily integrity of the surrogate if 
she did not consent, and could not be enforced. As with the requirement to hand over the 
baby, specific performance of such terms would be inappropriate, not to mention illegal, 
as they would amount to assault and battery. 37 
Other contractual terms for things such as taking care of health needs (to a 
reasonable extent) and agreeing to breastfeed, do not seem such significant interferences 
of bodily autonomy, as long as they are clearly consented to when the contract is first set 
out. Once again, breach of any terms that required the continuation of a personal service 
would likely be remedied by damages rather than specific performance. Statutory 
guidelines could set out in general terms what sort of arrangements a commercial 
surrogacy contract could permissibly entail, with the finer points settled between the 
parties. Guidelines could also require a minimum wage to be paid to the surrogate, as a 
protection against exploitation, and clauses stating that payment is contingent on a live 
birth could be restricted in order to protect the surrogate and prevent elements of baby-
selling. 
By accepting that some contractual terms could at least be remedied by damages, 
some certainty in commercial surrogacy contracts would be obtained. At the same time, 
limiting the validity of particular terms, which unduly restricted the surrogate's bodily 
integrity, would satisfy those who feared surrogates loosing control over their own body. 
36 Ibid, p 312. 
37 Ibid, p 313. 
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5.5 Regulation 
Even if my preferred option for a partially enforceable contract was accepted, for a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement to come to its intended conclusion, the child must 
still be adopted by the commissioning parents. The Law Commission has noted that this 
may pose some conceptual difficulties, as "the purpose of adoption should be to provide 
an option for children whose families cannot or will not care for them, whereas surrogacy 
involves deliberately creating a child to be handed over to another couple."38 
The Law Commission aclrnowledges surrogacy cannot be treated in totally the 
same way as adoption. Surrogacy, and commercial surrogacy in particular, involves 
issues additional to those that arise with adoption. As } have repeated throughout this 
dissertation, there is a strong need for regulation in commercial surrogacy. It is important 
that all parties are screened prior to attempting conception. This is so as to deal with 
matters such as ensuring the potential surrogate feels she is capable of giving up a child; 
determining the reasons for the commissioning couple trying surrogacy (e.g. to ensure it 
is not for convenience etc); and medically screening all participants, including the 
surrogate's partner, for infections and conditions such as AIDS. Additionally it is 
important that all parties receive counselling and independent legal advice. They all need 
to know what to expect, what the other parties expect, and what could go wrong. 
While it should be obvious how important it is that such screenmg and 
counselling occurs before the conception and birth of a child, it is less obvious that 
parties to a commercial surrogacy agreement will seek out such assistance of their own 
accord. Additionally, as many surrogacy arrangements can be initiated in secret, it is 
difficult to see how such regulatory requirements could be enforced at this early stage of 
an arrangement. The Law Commission suggests a structure to regulate before the baby is 
38 Law Commission, Report 65, "Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New 
Framework" Wellington, September 2000, p 199, 
http://www.1awcom.govt.nz/documents/pub1icationsR65ado.PDF, accessed 26/03/05. 
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conceived. Once the baby is conceived, the regular adoption procedures could be 
followed. 39 I will discuss this suggestion for regulation below. 
The Law Commission has also said that commissioning parents often do not apply 
to adopt the child until it has already been living with them for some time. This presents 
the court with a fait accompli, as although the couple have breached the requirements 
regulating the placement of children for adoption, the child may have bonded with the 
commissioning parents.40 So while the courts do not want to encourage breaches of 
regulation, it may not be in the child's best interests to be taken from a family it has 
bonded to. This was the situation in the Baby M case. Legally what the commissioning 
couple should do is be screened by Child Youth and Family Services (CYFS) before 
taking custody of the child. Unless the surrogate is related to the commissioning couple, 
not letting CYFS screen them is a breach of s6 of the Adoption Act. 
Some people argue against the need for commissioning parents to be screened for 
suitability, particularly when the child will often be genetically related to them. Similar 
screening is not required of parents who reproduce in the traditional way, or of 
consumers of fertility services who may use donor eggs and sperm, and thus may not be 
genetically related to their child. However I find compelling, as does the Law 
Commission, the argument that "because care of the child is being transferred from the 
birth parent to a person unrelated at law, the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring the 
suitability of the proposed parents to care for the child."41 As the process governing the 
transference of custody is sanctioned under the law, the State becomes responsible for 
ensuring the transfer is responsible. If transference of custody, without screening, 
ultimately harmed the child, the State would be partially responsible. 
Even if the comm1sswmng parents apply for adoption immediately, several 
aspects of commercial surrogacy amount to breaches of the Adoption Act 1955. In two 
39 Ibid, p 200. 
40 Ibid, p 201. 
41 Idem. 
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New Zealand cases, ReAdoption of P andRe Adoption ofG42, advertising, paying money 
to the birth mother, and assuming care of the child without approval from CYFS, were all 
breaches of the Adoption Act. However orders for adoption were made on the basis that 
the commissioning parents were suitable and that the payments were for surrogacy and 
not adoption. While these breaches of the Adoption Act did not bar adoption orders being 
made, the court's approach may be different now that commercial surrogacy has 
explicitly been made illegal. 
If the prohibition against commercial surrogacy were to be lifted, adjustments to 
adoption law would need to made, in order for commissioning parents to feel more secure 
in applying for adoption. Applying for an adoption order, knowing they have breached 
the Act they are applying under, must be nerve-racking for commissioning parents, as 
they can only hope the court will not find the breach sufficient to bar an adoption order. 
This is only likely to cause commissioning parents to shun formal adoption. However if 
the commissioning parents just take the child home, they have no legal rights or 
responsibilities for the child, thus the situation of the child is far from secure. While the 
parents may apply for guardianship through the Family Court, this will give them the 
legal rights and responsibilities, but not the status of parents, and will not affect the rights 
and responsibilities of the legal parents.43 It has been recommended to the Law 
Commission that there be a fast-track procedure for adoption by commissioning parents 
to ensure stability for the child.44 
So with commercial surrogacy we face three problems: it will be difficult to 
enforce regulatory requirements that parties go through screening and counselling prior to 
conception; it will be difficult to ensure that commissioning couples are screened by 
CYFS for suitability before they take custody of the child; and there is no encouragement 
for adoptive parents to go through the formal adoption process. A proposal by the Law 
42 ReAdoption of P [1990] NZFLR 385 Judge McAloon, ReAdoption ofG Unreported (3 February 1993) 
DC Invercargill Adopt 6/92 Judge Neal. 
43 Law Commission, New Issues in Legal Parenthood: A Discussion Paper, Preliminary Paper 54, 
Wellington, 2004, p 45. 
44 Mark Henaghan and Pip Cobcroft, "When Biotechnology and Law Collide: Assisted Human 
Reproduction and Family Law" Butterworths Family Law Journal, Vol. 4, June 2003, Part 6, p 143. 
77 
Commission, regarding surrogacy in general, would solve all these problems. I suggest 
their proposal is an excellent way to regulate commercial surrogacy arrangements. 
5.5.1 Law Commission's Proposal 
The Law Commission proposes that a pre-conception assessment of the 
commissioning couple should be carried out by CYFS. The assessment would determine 
whether the commissioning parents were acceptable applicants for an adoption order, and 
would require that the appropriate screening and counselling had taken place. The benefit 
to the commissioning couple would be certainty that their application for adoption would 
not be stalled or rejected once the child was born. The benefit to the child of this pre-
conception assessment would be that their future would be more certain. The 
Commission also suggests that to persuade those involved in surrogacy arrangements 
against presenting the court with a fait accompli (as discussed above) a disincentive be 
put in place. This disincentive would be that those persons failing to comply with the 
above requirements would face a rebuttable presumption that they are not suitable parents 
for that child, thus making their application for adoption more difficult.45 The 
Commission adds that medical practitioners should be forbidden to assist with surrogacy 
arrangements that have not received pre-approval.46 I would extend this restriction to 
include legal professionals who assist with surrogacy arrangements past the point where 
pre-approval should be obtained. 
I would also extend this restriction to include commercial surrogacy brokers. 
Brokers are those persons who bring willing surrogates and hopeful couples together, 
charging a fee for this service. Such persons are occasionally exploitative, charging 
almost as much as the surrogate gets paid, if not more, without even ensuring that 
appropriate screening, counselling and legal advice takes place. American Lawyer and 
surrogacy pioneer Noel Keane arranged the surrogacy arrangements in both the Baby M 
case and the Malahoff case, discussed above. Both of these infamous examples of 
45 Supra 38, p 202. 
46 Ibid, p 203. 
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surrogacy agreement break-downs appear to have been seriously mismanaged. At the 
time of the Baby M case, Keane was being sued by four surrogates from his program, 
including Baby M's mother, who was suing for fraud and negligence. It has been 
suggested his screening and counseling procedures were less than scrupulous. He 
received fees of $5,000 and $7,500 for his part in these cases, while the surrogates 
received $10,000.47 
By using the form of regulation suggested by the Law Commission, those persons 
wanting to become involved in commercial surrogacy would be given sufficient incentive 
to abide by the regulation. In this way they would be subject to the necessary screening 
and counselling, and would likely abide by adoption laws, thus avoiding presenting the 
court with such awkward decisions, and thereby ensuring the best interests of the child. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Though perhaps as few as one percent of commercial surrogacy contracts break down, 
the case examples discussed above demonstrate that the consequences are severe when an 
arrangement does not go as intended. The best approach is therefore to set a clear 
legislative framework for commercial surrogacy. In my opinion, the best solution in 
terms of the status of a commercial contract is to make it enforceable in part, with 
damages an available remedy. This results in some security for the contracting parties, 
knowing that terms are enforceable and damages are payable in the event of non-
fulfilment. At the same time, the surrogate cannot be forced to give up the child if she 
changes her mind. I believe the best solution in terms of regulation is a pre-conception 
assessment as suggested by the Law Commission. This would ensure that appropriate 
counselling and screenings occurs, reassure parents that acquiring parental status through 
the proper channel is most beneficial to all parties, and thus ensure the stability and 
security of surrogate children by settling the legal status of their parents. 
47 Supra 3, p 333, footnote 11. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Infertility can have a devastating effect on people's lives. The wish to have children is a 
basic human desire, and for some people surrogacy is the only option to fulfil this desire. 
Compassionate surrogacy is lawful in New Zealand and is generally regarded as a 
positive thing. But surrogacy is not free from cost for the surrogate. They are likely to 
incur medical expenses, clothing costs and they may face loss of income. Yet none of 
these expenses can lawfully be charged to the commissioning parents. Section 14 of the 
HART Act makes it an offence to give or receive valuable consideration for participation 
in a surrogacy arrangement except for very limited reasons. Surrogacy is therefore 
unattractive in financial terms and discouraged. Thus to make surrogacy arrangements 
more accessible, and to allow adequate compensation for the service a surrogate provides, 
commercial surrogacy should also be a legal option for infertile persons who have limited 
alternative options. Surrogacy should not be used merely for convenience, as mere 
convenience cannot justify transferring the burden of risk of pregnancy from one woman 
to another, and such a practice could lead to a class-like system for reproduction. 
However with sufficient regulation, commercial surrogacy can be immensely rewarding 
for all parties involved. Allowing commercial surrogacy would be comparable to other 
recent public policy changes particularly in the area of organ donation. 
Criminalising commercial surrogacy, as the HART Act recently has, interferes 
with the procreational liberty of those persons who have limited alternative options. 
Procreational liberty is a right to decide whether or not to reproduce, and for those people 
for whom commercial surrogacy is a last resort, prohibiting commercial surrogacy 
effectively takes away the opportunity to decide. No matter what the circumstances of 
conception and gestation, for the commissioning parents the event of reproduction has the 
meaning and significance that procreational liberty deems worthy of protection. 
Procreational liberty as a right may only be limited where it affects the rights of others or 
would ignore the interests of the child intended to be brought into the world. 
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It is debatable whether procreational liberty also protects the rights of women 
wanting to act as surrogates for money. However, not allowing them to charge for the 
services they provide in a surrogacy arrangement does interfere with their autonomy. 
Autonomy, while not being an absolute right, is a very significant one that should not be 
interfered with lightly. As commercial surrogacy does not cause significant harm, a 
woman's right to make an autonomous decision about being a commercial surrogate 
should be protected. 
As commercial surrogacy does not cause significant harm, it should also be 
allowed in order to protect all potential parties' rights to freedom of contract. The right of 
persons to bind themselves legally should not be subject to external interference when the 
contract is based on mutual agreement and free choice, and would not cause significant 
harm or involve illegal matters. While public policy may limit commercial surrogacy 
contracts, this limit does not make the contract worthless, as contracts are always 
potentially subject to the restrictions of public policy. Therefore the right to freedom of 
contract does support the right to contract for surrogacy. 
The primarily emotional arguments against commercial surrogacy, while worthy 
of consideration, do not amount to reason for banning the practice. Arguments regarding 
the severing of the mother-child relationship and the intrusion into the unity of marriage 
can be dismissed with rational arguments. The deep-seated emotional concerns that 
remam despite such reasoning must be respected, but cannot be allowed to 
disproportionately influence public policy decisions. More than moral discomfort is 
needed in order to interfere with the rights of procreational liberty, autonomy and 
freedom of contract. 
Harm to children, if proven, would be good reason to interfere with the above 
mentioned rights. However this argument is not made convincingly by opponents. It 
appears the psychological harms said to arise from being separated from one's parents or 
discovering money changed hands over one's birth, may in fact be less of a worry in 
commercial surrogacy than in comparative practices such as adoption and AID. These 
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harms, and suggestions that a child is premeditatedly harmed by commercial surrogacy, 
are nothing more than speculation. Harm from intolerance and from arrangement 
breakdowns can hardly be said to be unique to commercial surrogacy, as these are risks 
all children face. As for harm to those children who might otherwise have been adopted, 
many people tum to surrogacy because there are not enough children available for 
adoption, and at any rate, infertile persons bear no more responsibility for neglected 
children than anyone else. These arguments are not only unconvincing, they also apply to 
many other practices; and in particular compassionate surrogacy, which has been 
accepted in New Zealand despite these arguments. Thus they do not amount to a 
sufficient reason to ban commercial surrogacy. 
The argument that commercial surrogacy exploits women does not justify 
interference with the above mentioned rights either, as the claimed exploitation either 
does not exist, or where it does exist, is not necessarily harmful. The claim that 
commercial surrogacy is exploitative because desperate need undermines consent is 
inadequate because many contracts result from desperate need and this justifies only 
regulation, not prohibition. Also most surrogates do not seem to enter commercial 
surrogacy arrangements because of a desperate need for money. The argument that 
offering a woman money to be a surrogate is exploitative because it is coercive is 
incorrect, as it is an offer to make the woman better off, not a threat to make her worse 
off. The money offered may be an inducement, but then most employment involves 
inducement. In fact paying a surrogate for her services may be less exploitative than 
expecting her to provide her services for free. The transference of risk of pregnancy from 
one woman to another in surrogacy is not dissimilar to many other jobs women take on. 
This is not a reason to prohibit commercial surrogacy; rather it strengthens the argument 
that surrogates should be adequately compensated. Incommensurability does not show 
commercial surrogacy to be exploitative as it does not prove any party is negatively 
affected, and an object or service's value will usually be subjective. The argument that 
commercial surrogacy commodifies a form of labour that should never be exchanged for 
money does not establish that it harms or exploits surrogates. As for whether it harms 
women as a class by reinforcing inequalities of gender, the intolerance of some persons 
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does not justify restricting the freedom of women. At any rate, evidence of exploitation 
does not justify prohibition if commercial surrogacy is still of benefit to all parties. When 
sufficient regulation of commercial surrogacy is in place, that would appear to be the 
case. 
The argument that commercial surrogacy commodifies children wrongly relies on 
the assertion that commercial surrogacy is baby-selling. The fee in commercial surrogacy 
pays for the service the surrogate provides in carrying and delivering the child. It is not 
payment for the transfer of the baby, thus it is not baby selling. This is particularly 
apparent when we see that the commissioning parents cannot treat the child as a 
commodity, and must pay the surrogate even if the child is stillborn, thus showing that 
they have paid for a service and not for a child. While it may then be said that the 
surrogate's labour is commodified, this is not problematic, as any arguments that 
women's labour should be treated differently from other types of labour we usually pay 
for are unconvincing. Attempts to show commercial surrogacy to be problematic through 
comparisons to prostitution rely on silly slippery slope arguments, and in fact suggest we 
are being overly cautious as prostitution has been decriminalised. Labelling reproduction 
as noble labour is no more helpful in opposing commercial surrogacy, as much noble 
labour is paid for. 
Restricting commercial surrogacy is said to be necessary in order to prevent the 
decline of altruism in society. However prohibition will merely create a state of artificial 
altruism; people will only decline to participate in commercial surrogacy because of legal 
restrictions, not because they are trying to protect the altruistic integrity of surrogacy. At 
any rate, we have not similarly admonished those who charge for their services in caring 
for children or elderly, among other services that once were solely altruistic. And 
significantly, this argument ignores that altruism is in fact a significant motivation for 
many, if not most, commercial surrogates; monetary compensation and altruistic 
motivations are not mutually exclusive. 
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The introduction of the HART Act, and recent changes to the regulation of 
compassionate NF surrogacy, indicate that policy in New Zealand is moving towards 
tighter restrictions on surrogacy, rather than becoming more moderate. The more 
appropriate response would be to introduce appropriate regulation, rather than blanket 
prohibition. Regulation would require deciding on the status of commercial surrogacy 
contracts. I have argued that they should be enforceable in regard to the financial terms 
but that transfer of parenthood should be subject to the child's best interests, with 
damages available for breach of contract. The experiences of other countries suggest that 
criminalisation is not the most effective method. Regulation would also limit the kinds of 
clauses a surrogacy contract could legally include. Though adoption is the method used to 
transfer legal parenthood from the surrogate and her partner to the commissioning 
parents, adoption law was not formatted with surrogacy in mind and the particularities of 
commercial surrogacy are not adequately dealt with by adoption law. 
The regulatory proposal made by the Law Commission would be a more 
appropriate process for dealing with commercial surrogacy. A pre-conception assessment 
would ensure the appropriate counselling and screening was carried out before 
conception occurred, and would improve the process for transferring parenthood to the 
commissioning parents. The child's situation would be more stable with parenthood 
legally determined at this early stage, and the rebuttable presumption of suitability would 
provide adequate incentives for parents to comply with the regulation. 
Commercial surrogacy can be a valuable and admirable practice. Restricting it 
unjustly interferes with person's rights ofprocreationalliberty, autonomy and freedom of 
contract. Arguments that it harms children, exploits women, commodifies women and 
children and reduces altruism in the community do not stand up to scrutiny, and do not 
provide justification for the interference with those rights. Any risks associated with 
commercial surrogacy can be adequately dealt with by sufficient regulation. Thus the 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy in New Zealand should be lifted, and New 
Zealanders should be able to access commercial surrogacy if they so wish. 
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